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RECENT DECISIONS
APPEAL AND ERROR-AUTHORITY OF COURT Or APPEALS TO CONSTRUE INSTRUMENT
AND RE iEw QUESTIONS OF FAcT.-The plaintiff's assignor contracted to lease six trucks
to defendant ". .for a period of three (3) years to commence on the date the con-
tracted truck(s) is (are) put into the service of the Lessee." Four smaller trucks were
put into the service of the defendant on June 1, 1946. Two larger trucks were put in
defendant's service on October 22, 1946. All the trucks were returned three years
from the date of the first delivery. In an action for the rentals for the period June 1,
1949 to October 22, 1949, plaintiff-lessor claimed that the three year period for all the
trucks began on the date of the second delivery, terminating, October 22, 1949, and the
defendant-lessee contended that it commenced on the date of the earlier delivery, ter-
minating June 1, 1949. After an oral decision in favor of the plaintiff-lessor, the
defendant-lessee suggested that the period for at least the four smaller trucks began on
June 1, 1946. The trial justice then specifically held that the contract was not divisible
and gave defendant's counsel an exception on that point. The Appellate Division
modified the judgment finding that the agreement was, in fact, divisible. The com-
mencement dates were adjusted accordingly. On appeal, held, two judges dissenting,
affirmed. Rentways, Inc. v. O'Neill Milk & Cream Co., 308 N.Y. 342, 126 N.E. 2d
271 (1955).
The construction of an unambiguous contract is a question of law and hence is open
to the Court of Appeals.' Further, where the contract is unambiguous, evidence of
prior or contemporaneous negotiations or agreements may not be offered to vary or
change the terms of the contract and the agreement alone is open to review. 2 This is the
rule even where the equities may favor a ruling to the contrary. In the instant case, even
though the Court of Appeals observes that the contract is ambiguous4 and bases its
ultimate decision on facts surrounding the execution and performance of the contract
as indicative of the intent of the parties,5 it justifies its authority to review the decision
on appeal as if it were construing the contract alone and treats it as a question of
law.8 Because the contract in the present case can only be interpreted as ambiguous, 7
1. N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 7 (1951); N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 605 (1942); 6 Carmody, New
York Practice § 806 (1934) and cases cited.
2. Nichols v. Nichols, 306 N.Y. 490, 119 N.E. 2d 351 (1954); Johnson v. Western Union
Telegraph Co., 293 N.Y. 379, 57 N.E. 2d 721 (1944); Nau v. Vulcan Rail and Construction
Co., 286 N.Y. 188, 36 N.E. 2d 106 (1941); Wendel Foundation v. Moredall Realty Corp.,
282 N.Y. 239, 26 N.E. 2d 241 (1940).
3. Weinberg & Holman, Inc. v. Providence Washington Ins. Co., 254 N.Y. 387, 173 N.E.
556 (1930).
4. "The agreement in the present case may, perhaps, be ambiguous as respects its com-
mencement date .... " The court also intimates that the contract might be held indivisible
"..in some other connection or for some other purpose." Rentways, Inc. v. O'Neill Milk
& Cream Co., 308 N.Y. 342, 347-48, 126 N.E. 2d 271, 273-74(1955).
5. Referring to the manner of performance and execution, the court said: "This practical
construction of the contract reflected the parties' intent that their respective obligations as
to the four small vehicles be treated as separate and distinct from those affecting the large
vehicles." Id. at 348, 126 N.E. at 274.
6. To support its position the court cites texts dealing with pure questions of law, namely:
3 Williston, Contracts § 607 (rev. ed. 1936); Cohen & Karger, Powers of the New York
Court of Appeals 625-28 (1952). It also cites Persky v. Bank of America Nat. Ass'n, 261
N.Y. 212, 185 N.E. 77 (1933), in which case the Court of Appeals construed an Instrument
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the intent of the parties should become the governing principle in determining its
divisibility s and since intent is a question of fact, it may be resolved by resort to the
circumstances contemporaneous with and subsequent to the execution of the contract. 9
However, questions of law are the particular province of the Court of Appeals' 0 and
that body ordinarily may review findings of fact only when they present a question of
law, viz., when the evidence educed below is not sufficient to justify the conclusion of
law drawn by the intermediate court.' Even when it so acts, the question before the
Court of Appeals is not whether the findings below are in accord with the weight of
evidence, but it is simply whether there is any evidence which, if accepted as true,
would sustain the findings.' 2 It cannot be said that this was the rule upon which the
court relied in making its decision.' 3 Indeed, it is plain that the proposition upon which
the court proceeds is that since the contract is in the record they may construe it,
construction being a matter of law open to the Court of Appeals.
It develops, therefore, that the question before the court actually was one of fact,
namely, whether the parties' negotiations and the manner of performance evinced an
intention to make a divisible or an indivisible contract. The conclusion that the con-
tract was divisible is an equitable one as the dissenting opinion in the Appellate Divi-
sion reluctantly concedes14 and it could have been justified without straining the
existing law. There are, however, two objections to the reversal of the trial court's
determination of the intent of the parties. The first of the two objections to such a
disposition of the case was, in a sense, raised before and answered by the Court of
Appeals; it is that a case should be disposed of on appeal on the same theory upon
which it was tried and decided, 15 and, therefore, since the trial at Special Term pro-
as being non-negotiable on its face as a matter of law and where extraneous facts were not
considered because the nature of the instrument itself was dear. Hence, we see that the
Persky decision, though relied upon by both the prevailing and dissenting opinions herein Is
readily distinguishable from the case at hand.
7. Since, by its terms, performance might be divided into two or more parts each of
which corresponds to and is in exchange for a corresponding performance by the other party,
it would seem to fit the general definition of divisibility. Restatement, Contracts § 266
(1932); 3 Williston, Contracts § 861 (rev. ed. 1936). On the other hand, we find equally
competent authority to the effect that in an ordinary contract one is not bound to receive
delivery in installments and is entitled to delivery of all the goods at the same time. 3
Williston, Contracts § 861 (revised 1936) ; Restatement, Contracts § 267 (1932).
8. 3 Williston, Contracts §§ 721, 861, 862 (rev. ed. 1936).
9. Richardson, Evidence §§ 432, 444, 447 (7th ed. 1948) and cases cited.
10. N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 7 (1951); N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 605 (1942).
11. Jorgensen v. Jaeger, 257 N.Y. 171, 177 N.E. 410 (1931); Dennerlein v. Martin, 247
N.Y. 145, 159 N.E. 891 (1928); Gilbert v. Rosen, 232 N.Y. 296, 133 N.E. 896 (1922); In re
Case, 214 N.Y. 199, 103 N.E. 403 (1915); Faber v. City of New York, 213 N.Y. 411, 107
N.E. 756 (1915). See also Persky v. Bank of America Nat'l Ass'n, 261 N.Y. 212, 185 N.E.
77 (1933).
12. Townsend v. Bell, 167 N.Y. 462, 60 N.E. 757 (1901).
13. Obviously there was enough evidence for the Appellate Division and Court of Appeals
to hold for divisibility for that was their determination. On the other hand, the dienting
opinions in both appellate courts and the decision in the trial court maintained that the
contract was not divisible, this indicating that there must have been some credible evidence
to that effect. The evidence against divisibility is concisely set forth in the Appellate Division
dissent, 282 App. Div. 924, 125 N.Y.S. 2d 282, 283 (1st Dep't 1953).
14. 282 App. Div. 924, 925, 125 N.Y.S. 2d 282, 283 (1st Dep't 1953).
15. "The authorities are numerous and uniform to the effect that a case should be di.posed
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ceeded on the theory that the contract was indivisible, the argument that it was
divisible could not be raised on this appeal.'0 However, the majority opinion correctly
points out that the interpretation of divisibility adopted by the Appellate Division was
advanced by the defendant in the trial court by way of exception to the trial court's
orally delivered decision.' 7 Hence, although the major portion of the trial proceeded
on a different theory, it is enough that the theory or question presented on appeal be
suggested at the time of the trial. Persky v. Bank of America Nat'l Ass'n&,8 though
cited in the dissenting opinion in the immediate case, repeats a statement made earlier
in Martin v. Home Bank'9 that "'it is well settled that this court will not, for the
purpose of reversing a judgment, entertain questions not raised or argued at the trial,
or upon the intermediate appeal.' "20 Quoting another earlier decision 21 the Persky
opinion notes that "'as a general rule a party, who has obtained a judgment will not
be allowed in this court to sustain that judgment upon grounds which were not con-
sidered in the courts below.' "2 Thus, it would appear that the introduction of the
question of divisibility by defendant's counsel was timely enough to permit review by
the Court of Appeals.
The second objection to the resolution of the case as a question of fact would be
that the highest court of the state is primarily a court of law and that its jurisdiction
is primarily limited to questions of law.2 3 The same section of the New York State
Constitution which identifies the Court of Appeals as a court of law and limits its
jurisdiction thereto, specifically excepts cases ". . .where the appellate division, on
reversing or modifying a final or interlocutory judgment in an action or a final or
interlocutory order in a special proceeding, finds new facts and a final judgment or a
final order pursuant thereto is entered . ,,. 4 The companion provision of the Civil
Practice Act is almost identical in verbiage 2 5 The phrase, "new facts" certainly does
not mean new evidentiary facts, for the record made in the trial court is the record on
appeal and nothing may be added or subtracted. It is evident that conclusory facts
or findings of fact were contemplated by the legislature and by the framers of the
constitution. Judicial interpretation of the constitution 0 and later of both the constitu-
tion and the Civil Practice Act bear this out.27 Therefore, when the Appellate Division
reverses findings of fact, "new facts" have been found and the findings below are not
of on appeal upon the same theory upon which it was tried and decided." 6 Carmody, New
York Practice § 336 (2d ed. 1934) and cases cited.
16. See dissenting opinion, 308 N.Y. 342, 350, 126 N.E. 2d 271, 275 (1955).
17. 308 N.Y. at 349, n. 3, 126 N.E. 2d at 274, n. 3 (1955).
18. 261 N.Y. 212, 217, 185 N.E. 77, 79 (1933).
19. 160 N.Y. 190, 54 N.E. 717 (1899). See also Flandrow v. Hammond, 148 N.Y. 129,
42 N.E. 511 (1895); Gillies v. Manhattan Beach Improvement Co., 147 N.Y. 420, 42 N.E.
196 (1895); Oliphant v. Bums, 146 N.Y. 218,40 N.E. 980 (1895).
20. 261 N.Y. at 217, 185 N.E. at 79. (Emphasis added.)
21. Wright v. Wright, 226 N.Y. 578, 123 N.E. 71 (1919).
22. 261 N.Y. at 217, 185 N.E. at 79. (Emphasis added.)
23. "The jurisdiction of the court of appeals shall be limited to the review of questions
of law. . . ." N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 7 (1951).
24. N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 7 (1951).
25. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 605 (1942).
26. National Cash Register Co. v. Remington Arms Co., 242 N.Y. 99, 151 N.E. 144 (1926).
27. Canepa v. State of New York, 306 N.Y. 272, 117 N.E. 2d 550 (1954); Bristol-Meyers
Co. v. Picker, 302 N.Y. 61, 96 N.E. 2d 177 (1950); Pocket Books v. Meyers, 292 N.Y. 58,
54 N.E. 2d 6 (1944); Harrington v Harrington, 290 N.Y. 126, 48 N.E. 2d 290 (1943);
Aerated Products Co. v. Godfrey, 290 N.Y. 92, 48 N.E. 2d 275 (1943).
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then conclusively upon the Court of Appeals.7s Further, the court is then obliged to
determine which set of findings is supported by the weight of credible evidence - and
is not restricted to the narrower problem of whether there is any evidence adequate to
sustain the conclusions of law. The trial justice in the immediate case held the contract
to be ambiguous and indivisible. He could only do so by finding as a fact that the
parties intended the contract to be indivisible. The Appellate Division specifically
reversed that finding on the basis of the facts in the record. Therefore, by utilizing
the applicable provisions of the constitution and Civil Practice Act, the Court of
Appeals could have considered the question of divisibility and rendered the same
ultimate decision without any deviation from the normal course of the law.
Co n=rrc op LAws-WoRaxAsN's COuIpENSATION STATUTES-FULL FArrH AND
CnRrr.--Petitioner and subcontractor, Missouri residents, entered into an employment
contract in Missouri. While working in Arkansas for the general contractor, a Louisiana
firm, petitioner was injured. He automatically received weekly compensation under
the Missouri Compensation Act which provided that the rights and remedies granted
thereunder excluded all others at common law or otherwise on account of injury or
death. Petitioner-employee then successfully brought suit in Arkansas against the
general contractor for common-law damages. The Court of Appeals reversed the Dis-
trict Court on the ground that the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution
barred recovery. On appeal, held, three justices dissenting, reversed. The state of the
forum, where the injury occurred, has sufficient interests to serve and protect and need
not give full faith and credit to the foreign statute. Carroll v. La=a, 349 U.S. 403
(1955).
Under the constitutional requirement of full faith and credit' a fundamental problem
arises when a forum applies its substantive law, whether statutory or common, which
is in direct conflict with the statute of a sister state. In the field of workmen's com-
pensation a source of difficulty is the exclusive remedy feature2 contained in many of
the states' acts. Whether or not one state may deny full faith and credit to a sister
state's exclusive workmen's compensation statute and apply her own law is a problem
which has faced the Supreme Court in the past.
Prior to Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper3 and Magnolia Petroleum Co. v.
Hunt,4 a worker employed in one state but injured in another during the course of
employment could seek his remedy under the acts of either or both states. Where
recovery was sought under two acts the amount awarded was limited to the greater
28. Roberts v. Fulmer, 301 N.Y. 277, 93 NX.. 2d 846 (1950); Chamberlain v. Feldman,
300 N.Y. 135, 89 N.E. 2d 863 (1949); and cases cited in note 27 supra.
29. Roberts v. Fulmer, 301 N.Y. 277, 93 N.E. 2d 846 (1950); Chamberlain v. Feldman,
300 N.Y. 135, 89 N.E. 2d 863 (1949).
1. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1.
2. Such a remedy attempts to give the state where the employment contracts was made
exclusive control to compensate the injured worker even if the injury occurs in another
state during the course of employment. See, e.g., Mo. Rev. Stat. § 287, 120, VAMS. (1949).
3. 286 US. 145 (1932). The employment contract was made in Vermont, the domicile of
the worker and site of contractor's principal business. The Vermont Compenation Act con-
tained an exclusive remedy feature. The worker was sent, as part of his employment, to New
Hampshire where death occurred. Administratrix sought recovery under New Hampschire tort
law.
4. 320 US. 430 (1943).
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sum which the worker was entitled under either of the two acts involved.5 The Brad-
ford case in 1932 altered the existing law by requiring that full faith and credit be
accorded to sister state workmen's compensation statutes. The Supreme Court in that
case formulated a "balance of interests" test by which the interests of the forum were
weighed with those of the other state involved in the event, to determine whether full
faith and credit would be accorded the statute of the other state. The Court considered
the temporary nature of the worker's employment in New Hampshire, where the injury
occurred, his Vermont residence, where the employment was entered into, the judicial
silence of New Hampshire that the Vermont Act violated its public policy, and the fact
that the worker left no dependents in New Hampshire as a result of the injury. It then
concluded that New Hampshire had only a casual interest and that the Vermont Act
was entitled to full faith and credit. This decision in effect deemed the locus of the
injury as being insufficient in itself to give the forum the right to open its courts to the
injured worker and apply its own remedy.6 Subsequently, in Alaska Packers Associa-
tion v. Industrial Accident Commission of California,7 the Court, again applying the
"balance of interests" test, held that because the injured worker would become a public
charge of California, if denied relief under its act, California had more than a casual
interest and outweighed that of Alaska. Therefore, recovery under the California act
was permitted and full faith and credit denied the Alaskan statute.8 Four years later,
the Court in Pacific Employers Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission0 departed con-
siderably from the decision in the Bradford case. There the act of the forum (Califor-
nia) was allowed to control and full faith and credit was denied the statute of the
state of employment (Massachusetts) on the ground that ". . . few matters could more
concern a state than an injury to a worker taking place within its borders." 10 The
Bradford case was distinguished by utilizing the fact that denial of recovery in Califor-
nia might require physicians and hospitals to go into Massachusetts to collect charges
for medical care given the injured worker in California and that California considered
the foreign act obnoxious to its public policy.
The instant case, apparently on all fours with the Bradford case, would seem to
overrule the latter decision because it makes decisive the locus of injury ". . even
though in this case . . . [the worker's] injury may have cast no burden on her or on
her institutions."" It was the existence of such a burden which distinguished Pacific
Employers from Bradford, but here such element is not present. The dissent in the
principal case points out that if the interest of the forum is to prevail over that of the
home state, the Bradford case should be explicitly overruled with reasons stating clearly
why that decision was ill-founded. The criticism seems valid because the present
decision would appear to reverse the application of full faith and credit to sister states'
exclusive remedy statutes in the area of workmen's compensation by giving to the
5. Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 290-94 (3d ed. 1949).
6. 80 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1139 (1932).
7. 294 U.S. 532 (1935). Employment contract was made in California for work to bo
performed in Alaska. Latter's exclusive remedy act was adopted by the parties. Worker,
non-resident of California, was injured in Alaska and brought suit under the California act.
8. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Sowers, 213 U.S. 55 (1909). Full faith and credit accorded
territorial law as well as state law.
9. 306 U.S. 493 (1939). Worker and employer, Massachusetts residents, contracted there.
Locus of injury was California. The Compensation Acts of both states contained exclusive
remedy features.
10. Id. at 504.
11. Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 413 (1955).
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forum the right to extend its relief to a worker merely because it is the situs of the
injury.
The dissenting opinion also argued that the insertion of the word "Acts" in the
statutory provision 12 which provides for the authentication of documents entitled to
full faith and credit, tends toward respecting Missouri's legislation. Congress has the
constitutional authority to enumerate those statutes which must be afforded full faith
and credit by the other states regardless of any local policy.13 Therefore, when re-
vising this statute, Congress could have enacted a national conflict-of-laws rule requir-
ing that in the area of workmen's compensation the state of employment or the state
of injury have precedence in governing the right to compensation. However, Congress
remained silent and on its face the revision of the authentication statute merely
"... . follows the language of Article IV, section 1 of the Constitution" '1 and is not
Congressional authority for arbitrarily according full faith and credit to the statutes
of a sister state and ignoring any considerations of local public policy.15
On the premise that the present decision takes away the applicability of full faith
and credit to the exclusive remedy provision of a state's workmen's compensation
statute, the question remains whether a state which is neither the situs of employment
nor of injury may now afford recovery to an injured worker and thus deny effect to
the exclusive remedy statute of the state of employment or that of the locus of injury.
Alaska Packers, Pacific Employers, and the instant case emphasize that the existence
of liability in the area of workmen's compensation is predicated upon the employer-
employee relationship which can give an interest to more than one state. If this
interest, absent injury or employment within the state, occurs'by virtue of the scope
of operation of the employer or employee in the state or because the worker is domi-
ciled within the state, it would seem sufficient to permit coverage under the act of the
state which has a substantial connection with the relation.10
The broader influence of the principal decision may be felt in the ultimate denial of
full faith and credit to state statutes involving commercial law and insurance. The
Supreme Court has consistently found that a policy which favors the application of
the law of the incorporating state better protects shareholders and members wherever
their lod and outweighs any claims of local state policy.17 The full faith and credit
clause has been the implementation of this policy even though it results in authorizing
one state to give extra-territorial effect to its legislative enactments. Therefore the
reasoning of this case, viz., that a state has considerable interests in events occurring
12. 28 US.C.A. § 1738 (1948). The third paragraph states: "Such Acts, records and
judicial proceedings... shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the
United States... as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State... from which
they are taken." Prior to 1948 the quoted paragraph did not include "Such Acts" but began:
"And the said records and judicial proceedings. .. 2
13. US. Coast. art. IV, § ."... [Alnd the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the
Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof."
No decision has been found which squarely gives Congress this authority, but see Jackson,
Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45 Col. L. Rev. 1 (1945).
14. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738 (1948) reviser's note.
15. Schmidt v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 242 Iowa 1307, 55 N.W. 2d 227 (1952) and
McGrath v. Tobin,-R.I.-, 103 A.2d 795 (1954), where two state supreme courts held
that no such change was intended by the revision and that such an extension of full faith
and credit would cause serious difficulties adversely affecting state sovereignty.
16. See Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 330 U.S. 469 (1947).
17. Order of United Commercial Travelers of America v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947);
Broderick v. Rosner, 294 US. 629 (1935).
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within her borders and she is exercising traditional powers of sovereignty when she
legislates concerning them, could be extended into other fields and if found to outweigh
the present policy could result in the denial of full faith and credit to such sister state
statutes.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-COMPULSORY TESTIMONY ACT OF 1954 VALM SUBSTITUTE
FOR PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION-A federal grand jury, upon an inquiry
into matters involving interference with and endangering of the national security, pro-
pounded certain questions to the defendant-witness, who refused to answer, asserting
his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. The United States Attorney
presented an application to the Federal District Court, pursuant to the federal im-
munity statute, for an order directing the witness to answer the questions he had
declined to answer. The witness opposed the application on the grounds that the statute
was unconstitutional and that the immunity granted was not broad enough to substitute
for the privilege. He alleged that no immunity statute could prevent all the penalties
and forfeitures arising from compelled testimony. The District Court granted the
order compelling the witness to answer the questions, holding that the immunity stat-
ute was valid and replaced the privilege granted by the fifth amendment. On appeal,
two judges concurring, held, affirmed adopting the District Court opinion. United
States v. Ullman, 221 F. 2d 760 (2d Cir. 1955).
The privilege against self-incrimination, found in the fifth amendment, originated in
England from the opposition to the ex officio oath administered by the English courts
of Star Chamber and High Commission of the early 17th Century. It became fixed in
English common law by the late 1600's and was carried over to the American colonies
by the early settlers.' After the Revolution the privilege appeared in various forms in
the state constitutions and thence it was incorporated into the Federal Constitution
under the fifth amendment.2 A counterpart to the privilege is the device of the im-
munity statute which seeks to indemnify a witness in a proceeding in order "to obtain
information which the witness was withholding under claim of the privilege." 3 Such
statutes are usually limited to use when testifying before a specific body or concerning
specific classes of crime.4 The first federal immunity statute was passed in 1857 but
was repealed as being too liberal. It was replaced by another in 1862 which forbade
the use of a witness' testimony as evidence against him in a subsequent trial but not
the use of evidence gained from such testimony. This same provision was incorporated
into the Interstate Commerce Act in 1887. Five years later the Supreme Court declared
this immunity statute to be invalid for failure to be co-extensive with the privilege.0
The Court also declared that the privilege was limited to safeguarding against com-
pulsory self-incrimination which could lead to criminal penalties and criminal forfei-
tures. It was held not to be designed to protect against liabilities unless penal in
nature. Consequently, an immunity statute to be valid as to this limitation need only
guarantee that no evidence compelled under it will be used against the witness or be
1. Wigmore, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 15 Harv. L. Rev. 610 (1902);
Pittman, The Colonial and Constitutional History of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
in America, 21 Va. L. Rev. 763 (1935); Griswold, The Fifth Amendment Today (1955).
2. Huard, The Fifth Amendment-an Evaluation, 42 Geo. L. J. 345 (1954).
3. Taylor, Grand Inquest 215 (1955).
4. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2281 (3d ed. 1940).
5. Dixon, The Fifth Amendment and the Federal Immunity Statutes, 22 Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. 447 (1954); Taylor, Grand Inquest (1955).
6. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
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used to uncover new evidence in order to prosecute him An amended immunity pro-
vision to the Interstate Commerce Act was upheld by the Supreme Court in Brown v.
Walkers which declared that the statute satisfied the purpose of the privilege in pre-
venting a prosecution or penalty befalling the witness ". . . for or on account of any
transaction, matter or thing concerning which he may testify or produce evidence"O before
a grand jury. In dicta the Court also declared the statute applicable to state prosecu-
tions as to testimony compelled in a federal proceeding.' 0 The minority in the Brown
case thought the privilege to be irreplaceable by anything less than repeal of the
amendment and that the protection extended to the effects of disgrace and abhorrence.
The witness, the dissent felt, was entitled to absolute silence and nothing less.
Some recent cases, however, are seen as a narrowing of the privilege as set out in
Counselman v. Hitchcock." The witness before a grand jury has been held to have
waived the privilege by disclosure of a fact pertinent to the investigation and to be
no longer privileged as to its details. 2 The dissent in this case considered such a
construction of the doctrine of waiver an abatement of the privilege. Similarly, in
United States v. Field,13 the surety on a bail bond refused to answer the court's ques-
tions as to the convicted person's whereabouts and was held to have waived the privi-
lege to such questions by agreement under the bond with the government to produce
the bailed persons when required. Again the dissenting opinion sari this pre-testimonial
waiver as another wearing away of the constitutional right.
However, the privilege has also seen an apparent expansion in the aspect of whether
the specific question will tend to incriminate the witness. The rule concerning the
incriminatory tendency of a question was first formulated and applied by Chief Justice
Marshall in Aaron Burr's trial,' 4 wherein he decided that a secretary of Burr would
not tend to incriminate himself by answering whether or not he understood the contents
of a letter in cipher. The answer was not considered to be a link in the chain of evi-
dence needed to convict nor was it a source to forge the link. But of late the Supreme
Court has held that the witness validly invoked the privilege when questioned con-
cerning the whereabouts of a third party u The broader application of the rule in
this case was later cited in support of two subsequent Supreme Court decisions. In the
first of these two, the witness was privileged from answering as to his occupation o and
the second case pushed the range of possible incrimination to questions as to the oc-
cupation of persons other than the witness.' 7 It is doubtful that the questions on these
7. Ibid.
8. 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
9. The statute as quoted by the Court in 161 U.S. at 608.
10. In Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179 (1954) the Court held that a similarly worded
statute prevented the use of the defendant's testimony before a congressional committee in
a state prosecution. The Court did not pass on the question of the use of evidence derived
from such testimony but the District Court in the instant case held such a statute to be
applicable to state courts.
11. 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
12. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1950).
13. 193 F. 2d 92 (2d Cir. 1951).
14. United States v. Burr, In re Willie, 25 Fed. Cas. 38, No. 14,692a (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
15. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951).
16. Greenberg v. United States, 192 F. 2d 201 (3d Cir. 1951), rev'd per curiam, 343 U.S.
918 (1952).
17. Singleton v. United States, 193 F. 2d 464 (3d Cir. 1952), rev'd per curiam, 343 US.
944 (1952). The court of appeals for the Third Circuit dutifully followed the Greenberg and
Singleton cases in United States v. Coffey, 198 F. 2d 438 (3d Cir. 1952).
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latter cases would have been considered incriminating by Justice Marshall. Although
technically the court decides whether an answer to a question will tend to provide,
under the circumstances, a link in the chain of convicting evidence, in practice the
witness is the judge as to the danger of incrimination. The second of the above two
Supreme Court cases' 8 would seem to indicate that unless the answer to a question
could not possibly incriminate the witness his claim of privilege will be upheld. These
narrowing and expanding aspects of the fifth amendment show the privilege to be
elastic. However, the courts have shown no tendency to stretch the fifth amendment
to form an impregnable fortress of silence.
In the instant case, the witness in effect seeks to replace the existing law with the
dissenting opinion in Brown v. Walker. This view is based on the moral precept that
it is repugnant to compel a person to injure himself in any manner.' 9 Proponents of
this concept further urge that the penalties and forfeitures contemplated by the self-
incrimination privilege include loss of government employment, private sanctions and
public opprobrium.20 The court in the present case appears to be in sympathy with
this view as expressed by the concurring opinion which sees the validating of the
immunity statute as eroding the fifth amendment and the compelled testimony as
setting the stage for a perjury prosecution.
Such a broad concept would expand the meaning of the fifth amendment as inter-
preted by the Supreme Court,21 beyond the scope of any immunity statute. The
privilege has not been recognized as a fundamental right of man22 such as those rights
embodied in the first amendment and even these are limited by the principle that such
fundamental rights cannot be exercised to the detriment of a fellow citizen or of the
common good. 23 The privilege comes into conflict with the principle that the United
States is entitled to the testimony of every citizen.24 The present immunity statute
seeks to resolve this conflict in the area covered by espionage and subversion by gain-
ing the necessary testimony for the grand jury and at the same time shielding the
witness from penal liabilities.
Since the witness is practically the sole judge of whether answers to questions before
a qualified grand jury would tend to incriminate him,25 the added adoption of the abso-
lute view of non-compulsion could bring many grand jury inquiries into serious crime to a
standstill. The moral indignation against compelled self-incrimination which gave rise
to the broader view seems to have stemmed and gained vigor from the objectionable
methods and scope of recent congressional inquiries. 26 Here the same view is attempted
to be employed to a grand jury investigation whose secrecy stands as a safeguard
18. Singleton v. United States, supra note 17.
19. Boudin, The Immunity Bill, 42 Geo. L. J. 497 (1954); Griswold, The Fifth Amend-
ment Today (1955).
20. Boudin, supra note 19.
21. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896) ; Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 15 (1955).
22. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
23. Beauharmais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952); Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339
U.S. 382 (1950) ; Schenk v. United States, 249 U. S. 47 (1919).
24. See note 14 supra. See also, 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2192 (3d ed. 1940); Williams,
Problems of the Fifth Amendment, 24 Fordham L. Rev. 19 (1955); Brownell, Immunity
From Prosecution Versus Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 28 Tul. L. Rev. I (1933).
25. Singleton v. United States, 193 F. 2d 464 (3d Cir. 1952), rev'd per curam, 343 U.S.
944 (1952).
26. Boudin, The Immunity Bill, 42 Geo. L. J. 497 (1954); Griswold, The Fifth Amenu-




against liabilities incurred by compelled testimony. Although the judges in the instant
case seemed drawn to the absolute view and even though the Supreme Court has
granted certiorari,2 7 the upholding of such an interpretation of the privilege in the
light of past decisions is doubtful.
CORPORATiONs-APPLICATION o RuLE (23b) oF FEDERAL RuLs Or CIVIL PROCE-
DURE TO A DERIVATIVE ACTIoN UNDER T SECuRms ExcHaNE Acr.-Plaintiff, a
stockholder of the defendant corporation, brought a stockholder's derivative action
under section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act to compel an accounting of certain
alleged "short swing" profits made by the defendant stockholders through the sale of
corporate securities. Defendants moved to dismiss on the grounds that plaintiff failed
to allege that he was a stockholder at the time of the transaction of which he complains
as required by Rule 23(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Held, motion to
dismiss sustained, it being inequitable to allow a stockholder who had no interest in a
corporation at the time of the transaction of which he complains to institute a deriva-
tive action. Dottenheim v. furchison, 127 F. Supp. 790 (N.D. Tex. 1955).
Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act' provides that any profit realized by
the beneficial owner of more than ten percent of any equity security of a corporation
by reason of a purchase and sale or sale and purchase of any equity security of such
corporation within a period of less than six months shall inure to and be recoverable
by the affected corporation. In the event that the corporation fails to bring suit to
recover such profits within sixty days after request by any security holder of the
corporation, or does not pursue the suit diligently thereafter, any security holder may
bring an action in the name and on behalf of the corporation.2 The section then gives
a derivative right of action 3 to every stockholder though he holds a different class of
security from that of the defendant and will receive no tangible benefits from the suit 4
Because of section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act 5 a suit under section 16(b) may
be maintained only in a federal court0 and accordingly diversity of citizenship is not
27. Ullman v. United States, 349 U.S. 951 (1955).
1. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78p(b) (1934).
2. ". . . § 16(b) was designed to protect the 'outside' stockholders against at least Ehort-
swing speculation by insiders with advance information." Smolowe v. Delendo Corporation,
136 F. 2d 231, 235 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751, 12 Fordham L. Rev. 232 (1943).
See also Yourd, Trading in Securities By Directors, Officers and Stockholders: Section 16 of
the Securities Exchange Act, 38 Mich. L. Rev. 133, 139 (1939). The questions of good faith
and identity of shares are not material. Walet v. Jefferson Lake Sulphur Co., 202 F. 2d 433,
434, (5th Cir. 1953). See Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F. 2d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
341 US. 920 (1951) ; Smolowe v. Delendo Corporation, supra at 235-38.
3. Arbetman v. Playford, 83 F. Supp. 335, 336 (S.).N.Y. 1949); Benisch v. Cameron, 81
F. Supp. 882, 884 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) ; Pottish v. Divak, 71 F. Supp. 737, 739 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
"A derivative action is a suit by a shareholder to enforce a corporate cause of action. The
corporation is a necessary party to the suit. And the relief which is granted is a judgment
against a third person in favor of the corporation." Price v. Gurney, 324 U.S. 100, 105 (194S).
4. Smolowe v. Delendo Corporation, 136 F. 2d 231 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S.
751 (1943).
5. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78aa (1949).
6. Benisch v. Cameron, 81 F. Supp. 882 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); American Distilling Co. v.
Brown, 295 N.Y. 36, 64 N.E. 2d 347 (1945).
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a requirement for jurisdiction despite a dictum to that effect in the present decision.
The benefits of the action inure to the corporation in whose name the suit is brought, 7
but the plaintiff security holder is allowed counsel fees which "must not be too nig-
gardly" awarded out of the recovered fund.
Rule 23(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 9 by contrast, provides that the
plaintiff in a stockholder's derivative suit must aver that he was a shareholder at the
time of the transaction of which he complains. This rule was originally Equity Rule
94,10 the adoption of which by the United State Supreme Court in 1882 resulted from
the decision in Hawes v. Oakland." It was an attempt to make a judicial rule out of
the law of that case. Clause (2) of the rule, with its requirement that the plaintiff
allege that the suit is non-collusive in character is admittedly designed to prevent the
"manufacture" of federal jurisdiction. Additionally, it seems clear that the reason
behind clause (1), which requires that plaintiff allege that he was a shareholder at the
time of the complained of transaction, was to prevent the purchase of a cause of action.
The United States Supreme Court shortly after the Hawes case and the adoption of
Equity Rule 94, in a dictum, called clause (1) a matter of substantive law in distinction
to the jurisdictional character of clause (2).12 The position was affirmed, again by way
of a dictum, in Venner v. Great Northern Railway Company'8 where the Supreme
Court said that if ". . . it appears that the plaintiff has not shown a case within the
decision of Hawes v. Oakland, or the rule of court declaratory of that decision, the bill
should be dismissed for want of equity and not for want of jurisdiction."' 4 The propo-
sition that clause (1) is solely procedural,' 5 however, has considerable lower court
authority and the trend is in that direction today.16
7. Smolowe v. Delendo Corporation, 136 F. 2d 231, 239 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320
U.S. 751 (1943).
8. Id. at 241. See also Park & Tilford v. Schulte, 160 F. 2d 984, 989 (2d Cir. 1947), cert.
denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947).
9. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 23(b) (1948): "Secondary Action by Shareholders. In an action
brought to enforce a secondary right on the part of one or more shareholders in an associa-
tion, incorporated or unincorporated, because the association refuses to enforce rights which
may properly be asserted by it, the complaint shall be verified by oath and shall aver (1)
that the plaintiff was a shareholder at the time of the transaction of which he complains or
that his share thereafter devolved on him by operation of law and (2) that the action Is not
a collusive one to confer on a court of the United States jurisdiction of any action of which
it would not otherwise have jurisdiction. . ....
10. 104 U.S. IX (1882).
11. 104 U.S. 450 (1882).
12. Dimpfell v. Ohio & M.R. Co., 110 U.S. 209, 210 (1884). See also 3 Moore, Federal
Practice 1 23.15 at 3493-94 (2d ed. 1948).
13. 209 U.S. 24 (1908).
14. Id. at 34. See also Illinois Central R. Co. v. Adams, 180 U.S. 28 (1901); Jacobson
v. General Motors Corp., 22 F. Supp. 255 (S.DIN.Y. 1938); Home Fire Insurance Company
v. Barber, 67 Neb. 664, 93 N.W. 1024 (1903).
15. Perrott v. U. S. Banking Corp., 53 F. Supp. 953 (D. Del. 1944); York v. Guaranty
Trust Co. of New York, 143 F. 2d 503 (2d Cir. 1944), rev'd on other grounds, 326 U. S. 99
(1945); Piccard v. Sperry Corporation, 36 F. Supp. 1006 (S.D.N.Y. 1941), aff'd without
opinion, 120 F. 2d 328 (2d Cir. 1941) ; See also Seasongood, Right of a Shareholder, Suing
in Behalf of a Corporation, to Complain of Misdeeds Occurring Prior to His Acquisition of
Stock, 21 Harv. L. Rev. 195 (1908); Note, 38 Col. L. Rev. 1472, 1480-84 (1938).
16. See 3 Moore, Federal Practice 11 23.01 at 3409 (2d ed. 1948). "When considering
amendments to the Rules, which were eventually promulgated by the Court in 1946, the
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One such case, Benisch v. Cameron,'7 reasoned that since section 16(b) is an
. . instrument of a statutory policy of which the general public is the ultimate
beneficiary.. ."18 Congress did not intend to hamper such policy by procedural re-
strictions such as Rule 23(b). The Court noted that Rule 23(b) refers merely to
shareholders while section 16(b) allows any security holder to bring the action. Very
recently the Court of Appeals, for the Second Circuit, without mentioning the Benisch
case, similarly held Rule 23(b) inapplicable to an action under section 16(b) because
the rule ". . . cannot, even if so perhaps intended, override the direct mandate of
Section 16(b) that suit may be brought 'by the owner of any security' without
qualifications."'-9
In the present case the Texas District Court has raised a dissenting voice to the rule
set forth in the Benisch and Blau decisions. The court apparently treats clause (1) of
Rule 23(b) as stating an equitable principle which prevents a stockholder from purchas-
ing his cause of action at the same time that he purchases his securities. However, in
its peremptory dismissal of the Beniscl and BZau casesO the court fails to clarify the
underlying question.
The answer is in its final analysis a matter of determining congressional intent. The
present decision goes no further than to point out the applicability of one of the two
rules of law involved. It is true that the present suit is a derivative stockholder's suit
and has the earmarks of a strike action. Rule 23(b) was designed to strike a blow at
the professional minority stockholder by preventing the acquisition of a cause of action
by the purchase of a few shares of stock.21 However, in enacting 16(b) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act was Congress willing to let the minority stockholder buy his cause
of action as a drastic means of combating the evils of inside trading? The Benisch and
Blau decisions hold that the provision that suit may be brought by the holder of any
security means precisely this. If the statute means what these cases say it does the
court may not override it by the device of applying principles of equity. The instant
decision is thus deficient in not facing the crux of the problem which is the interrela-
tionship between these two apparently conflicting statutes.
If the present case is adopted by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit it merits
the consideration of the Supreme Court to resolve the conflict.
Advisory Committee considered at length the problem of clause (1) of subdivision (b) of
Rule 23 in the light of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins .... The Committee... concluded that it
is a debatable question whether the provision is one of substance or procedure, that the
answer should be given judicially by the Supreme Court, 'and that in the light of the material
in this note, the only inference to be drawn from a failure to amend Rule 23(b) would be
that the question is postponed to a litigated case." 3 Bloore, op. ciL supra at 3404.
17. 81 F. Supp. 882 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), 62 Harv. L. Rev. 1071 (1949).
18. Ic at 884.
19. Blau v. Mission Corporation, 212 F. 2d 77 (2d Cir. 1954), cerL denied, 347 US. 1016
(1954). This case also held Rule 23(b) to be procedural. Blau v. Ali.son Corporation, supra
at 79.
20. The court referred to those cases as not being..... relevant to this particular con-
troversy... 2' Dottenheim v. Murchison, 127 F. Supp. 790, 792 (N.D. Texas 1956).
21. It would seem that this is the first time the questions of substantiality of shares and
motive have arisen in an action under § 16(b) by a "subsequent stockholder." But cf.
Pellegrino v. Nesbit, 203 F. 2d 463, 466 (9th Cir. 1953), involving a suit under § 16(b) by a
stockholder who was such at the time of the transaction there in question. There the court
noted, 'In view of the statutory policy involved we need not be concerned with either the
substantiality of appellant's shareholder interest ... or appellant's motive in seeking to take
part in the litigation!'
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COURT'S-JUDGES--REFUSAL OF STATE'S HIGHEST COURT TO PUBLISH DISSENTING
OPINION OF ONE OF ITS MEMBERS UPHELD IN MANDAMUS ACTION BROUOIT TO
COMPEL OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.-The State Reporter of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, upon direction of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, refused to publish
appellant's dissenting opinion written upon a cause argued and determined before that
court. The dissenting justice instituted a mandamus proceeding against the State
Reporter to compel publication of his opinion; the writ was refused by the Court of
Common Pleas on the ground that the Supreme Court is not required to publish the
opinions of its justices. On appeal, held, one justice concurring, affirmed on the decision
of the lower court. Musmanno v. Eldredge, 382 Pa. 167, 114 A. 2d 511 (Petition for
rehearing denied, - Pa. - , June 13, 1955).
The proceeding in the instant case is without precedent. Controversy involving
officers of a state's judicial system over matter of official acts seldom finds expression
in an open forum; all the more surprising is it when that controversy resolves in actual
litigation. Nevertheless the instant decision cannot be dismissed simply as a question
of propriety, but rather proposes a fundamental question as to the right of a judge to
render an effective dissenting opinion.
The cause1 upon which the appellant's dissenting opinion was written involved a rule
of one of the lower courts of Pennsylvania, which prohibited the photographing of
witnesses, jurors, or litigants inside the courthouse or county jail or in the approaches
thereto.2 Promulgation of the rule and an apparent attempt to enforce it moved
affected news publishers to seek a writ of prohibition on the grounds that the rule
impinged upon the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press. The Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, to which application for the writ was made directly, held that,
since the rule had not been violated, and had been revised and amended since the
bringing of the petition, there was no justiciable controversy before the court, and
therefore dismissed the petition without prejudice. To this finding the appellant dis-
sented. However, an alleged informal agreement was reached whereby filing of the
dissent would be withheld provided that an expeditious appeal be allowed a test case
involving an open violation of the rule.3 The test case was not immediately forth-
coming,4 and appellant thereupon filed his dissenting opinion nine days after the
majority opinion was filed. The Supreme Court, in an informal letter sent by the Chief
Justice to the State Reporter, then directed that the dissent be omitted from the
official reports. The per curiam opinion of the majority was not actually reported until
four and one-half months later. Appellant then brought a petition for a writ of man-
damus to compel publication of his dissent.
The lower court, in refusing the dissenting justice's petition, stressed two early
Pennsylvania statutes, one of which banned the publication of minority opinions of
Supreme Court justices,5 and a subsequent one which authorized the state reporter
to publish minority opinions of the Supreme Court on all constitutional questions.0 The
1. Matter of the Application of the Tribune Review Publishing Co., 379 Pa. 92, 113 A. 2d
861 (1954).
2. Ct. C. P., Westmoreland County, Pa. Rule No. 205b (Feb. 25, 1954).
3. Argument for Appellant, p. 2, Musmanno v. Eldredge, 382 Pa. 167, 114 A. 2d 511
(1955).
4. Subsequently the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County, Pa., found six
newspaper men guilty of criminal contempt for taking pictures in violation of the ban. The
Supreme Court in the instant case notes that an appeal will be brought before It at the Fall
Session.
S. Pa. Stat., P.L. 374 § 2 (1845), (Repealed P.L. 1236 § 6, 1951).
6. Pa. Stat. tit. 17 § 1695 (1868).
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court observed that the former had been repealed, and that the latter was still in effect,
and concluded: "We do not believe the statute makes it mandatory for the reporter to
publish all dissenting opinions raising constitutional questions. We think rather that
they may be printed when the Supreme Court so directs." 7 The court added that it
also felt bound by the order of the Supreme Court which directed that the disrsent be
denied publication. The lower court's quest for statutory authority for the Supreme
Court order overlooked a related statute which directed the State Reporter to report
all decisions of the Supreme Court.8 This statute, like the statute of 1845, which
banned publication of minority opinions, was similarly repealed, but is also significant
in searching for legislative intent.
The Supreme Court, which affirmed on the basis of the lower court ruling, felt
bound to vindicate itself from the appellant's contentions made on argument of the
case and offered two reasons for its issuance of the order against publication. The first
was that appellant had violated the rules and practices of the court by filing his opinion
after the majority opinion was filed, and without first circulating it among the other
members of the court for their consideration, and secondly that the dissent was not a
proper one in that it discussed the merits of the controversy whereas the majority had
held that there was no justiciable controversy before the court. In a concurring
opinion, one justice stated that defendant had a right to have his opinion published,
but had waived it by concurring in the majority opinion.
Persuasive as these arguments sound their validity is questionable. It seems apparent
that there were no fixed rules concerning the filing and publication of a dissenting
opinion and, as the concurring opinion pointed out, one hundred sixty-nine years of
tradition and practice gave the appellant an absolute right to have his opinion pub-
lished. Furthermore, it was on the issue of whether or not a justiciable controversy
existed with which much of the dissenting opinion was concerned. The concurring
opinion's theory that the dissenting justice had waived his right by allegedly assenting
to the opinion of the court rests the determination of non-technical issues on a technical
and well-worn legal concept. Substantial rights should not be so easily lost.
The system of law by which we are governed is heavily dependent upon the proper
recording and publication of cases decided by our courts, particularly our appellate
courts, so that the public, the bar, the legislature, and even the courts themselves may
be made aware of the constant development of our decisional law both for present
and future guidance, and for statutory amendment. It follows from this need to know
that a judge, by virtue of his office, is duty bound not only to disseminate his opinion
to the majority of the court, but to record that opinion for publication, whether it be
dissenting or concurring. As a prerequisite the judge also has a right to have his
opinion published. It is submitted that a further conclusion follows from this need
to know, viz., that our courts, while they may have it in their discretion to decide
whether or not a case may be published at all, do not have discretionary power to
censor the opinions of their own justices, which would allow them to present to the
public and to posterity a misleading picture of the status of the law. The reasoning
for a court's decision would in many cases go unknown if dissenting voice was quieted.9
It appears that other jurisdictions do not restrict the free publication of decisions
and opinions of their courts, although New York for one does give its higher courts
7. Musmanno v. Eldredge. 1 P.D.&C. 2d 535, 538 (Ct. of C.P. 1955).
8. Pa. Stat. tit. 17 § 1696 (1889), (Repealed, P.L. 1236 § 6, 1951).
9. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419, (1793); Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. 393, (1857);
Pollock v. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co., 17 U.S. 429 (189S). The dissents here influenced the
passage of the eleventh, fourteenth and sixteenth amendments to the United States Constitu-
tion, respectively.
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statutory discretion to withhold from publication a decision in a given cause. 10 This
power would not seem to extend to a portion of the decision," and as a practical
matter all decisions and opinions are reported.12 The United States Supreme Court
decisions are by law required to be bound and published as soon as practicable after
rendition.13
Certainly the courts are not helpless to subdue a judge himself who exercises rights
in a manner contemptuous to and abusive of the court on which he sits. It would seem
that a judge who acted so improperly would subject himself to severe reprimand, if not
a judgment of contempt.' 4 A dissenting opinion is a vital portion of the whole decision
of a court, and ought not to be divorced therefrom. The conclusion is inescapable that
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania possessed neither legislative nor jurisprudential
authority to suppress appellant's dissenting opinion by ordering the State Reporter to
refuse it publication.
A further paradox presented by the instant case is the hearing and determination of
the appeal by those very justices who concurred in the issuance of the disputed order
(which appellant argued was not an official act of the court). Under the curious
circumstances it would have seemed proper that the high court justices withdrew from
consideration of the case, at least out of lip-service to judicial detachment if not out
of deference to their own order. Certainly an intermediate appellate court could have
determined the issue without embarrassment to its superior tribunal even by overriding
the no-publication order. Moreover, this would have permitted recognition of the court
as a behind-the-scenes party to the action. The canons of judicial ethics insist that: "A
judge should abstain from performing or taking part in any judicial act in which his
personal interests are involved."'1r It is even surprising that the court recognized
a "justiciable controversy" in the petition of its justice inasmuch as it could hardly be
expected to countermand its own order, and, inferentially, the court did not undertake
a serious consideration, because the lower court, on whose opinion the Supreme Court
relied, felt in part constrained by the latter courts' prior order. In this respect it would
not seem too far amiss to say that appellant was denied a substantial portion of due
process by which an essential right was denied.
The facts of the instant case point to strong personal conclusions and feelings on the
part of the justices involved, perhaps much of which account for and explain the entire
proceedings, veiled as they are in the respectability of courtroom mantle. Notwithstand-
ing the impact on judicial sanctity and its impersonalized administration, the instant
case raises such grave questions as to deserve more serious consideration. Perhaps
legislative concern will rectify any imbalances of rights and at the same time assure
that integrity of process that we traditionally expect of the judiciary.
10. N.Y. Judiciary Law § 431 (1938).
11. "With the exception of court of appeals and appellate division causes directed not to be
reported, as provided in section four hundred thirty-one of this article, the judges or justices
of every court of record, including surrogates, shall promptly cause to be delivered to the
state reporter, ...a copy of every written opinion rendered in causes determined therein."
N.Y. Judiciary Law § 432 (1939).
12. Special communication from the State Reporter of the State of New York to the
Fordham L. Rev. (Sept. 26, 1955).
13. "The decisions of the Supreme Court shall be printed, bound, and issued as soon as
practicable after rendition." 28 U.S.C.A. c. 19, § 411(a) (1949).
14. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 17, § 2041 (1836), providing that court officers are subject to con-
tempt for misconduct.
15. Canons of Judicial Ethics, No. 29, adopted by the American Bar Association, 1924.
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CnMNAL LAW-SUFFICENCY OF INDICTMENT BASED SOLELY 0. EI Av.-Defend-
ant was convicted on an indictment charging him with attempted tax evasion. On trial
at the close of the prosecution's evidence and again at the close of all the evidence,
defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that there was no lawful
evidence to support it. The motion was denied. On appeal, held, inter alia, affirming
the conviction on two counts, that although the indictment was based solely on hearsay
evidence, it was nevertheless sufficient to withstand the motion to dismiss. United
States v. Costello, 221 F. 2d 668 (2d Cir. 1955).
There have been many appellate decisions in the federal courts which have been
concerned with the broad question of the sufficiency of indictments based solely upon
incompetent evidence.1 In only two of these cases can the decision be said to have
actually turned upon the point.2 It is fairly well settled that where it appears that the
indictment is supported solely or substantially by evidence which would clearly be
inadmissible at trial, then it will be set aside on motion.3 There are some state author-
ities, however, which hold that courts may never inquire into the sufficienco of the
evidence before the grand jury, arguing that the grand jury alone determines the
competency of the evidence upon which it bases its indictmenL4 The argument that
such an inquiry is an invasion of the province of the grand jury refuses to recognize
that the primary purpose behind secrecy of grand jury proceedings is the nondisclosure
of accusations prior to prosecution. Another objection is that the entertaining of a
motion to quash for insufficiency necessitates a re-examination of the grand jury
minutes, which practice extends to the accused an undue advantage and encourages
subornation of testimony.5 Concededly, this possibility is always present; but under
such a view the accused has no recourse but to submit to a hazardous prosecution, even
when charged under an indictment supported by no competent evidence whatever.
Lastly, some cases set forth the view that errors committed by the grand jury may be
cured at trial and the right to object to incompetent evidence sufficiently safeguards the
accused.6 "_ . . [Ejut this attitude is inconsistent with the underlying purposes of the
Fifth Amendment. The very essence of the Amendment is that no one sAl be put to
the expense, hazards, and humiliation of a trial without a . . . disinterested prior
determination of probable guilt." 7
The court in the instant case reviewed the evidence before the grand jury,8 and
although finding it based solely on hearsay and thus incompetent, nevertheless refused
to quash the indictment. The court offers two principal grounds for its decision. First,
1. Brady v. United States, 24 F. 2d 405 (8th Cir. 1928); Nanfito v. United States, 20 F.
2d 376 (8th Cir. 1927) ; Mlurdick v. United States, 15 F. 2d 965 (Sth Cir. 1926) ; Olmstead v.
United States, 19 F. 2d 842 (9th Cir. 1927), atfd on other grounds, 277 US. 438 (1928) ; cf.
United States v. Beadon, 49 F. 2d 164 (2d Cir. 1931); United States v. Coolidge, 25 Fed. Cas.
622, No. 14,858 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815).
2. Brady v. United States, 24 F. 2d 405 (8th Cir. 1928); Nanfito v. United States, 20 F.
2d 376 (Sth Cir. 1927).
3. Ibid. See also McGregor v. United States, 134 Fed. 187 (4th Cir. 1904).
4. Barnes v. State, 134 Tex. Crim. 461, 116 S.W. 2d 403 (1938) ; Cox v. State, 3 Ga. App.
609, 60 S.E. 283 (1908).
5. Kastel v. United States, 23 F. 2d 156 (2d Cir. 1927), cert. denied, 277 U.S. 604 (1928).
6. Cf. United States v. Pappagoda, 288 Fed. 214 (W-). Conn. 1923).
7. Note, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 111, 114 (1948).
3. The court indicated that the point involved could have been disposed of upon proce-
dural grounds, but declined to so act since defendant could not possibly have known that the
proceeding had no lawful beginning and because the point raised went to the root and essence
of the prosecution's case.
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that such evidence may be as rationally persuasive as first-hand evidence and frequently
as trustworthy, as indicated by the many exceptions to the hearsay rule. It should be
noted, however, that these exceptions have been created not only because the type of
evidence they embrace is considered trustworthy, but for reasons of necessity.0 Second,
the court reasoned that hearsay is chiefly objectionable because its use deprives the
adversary of the right of cross-examination; but since a grand jury investigation is
unilateral in nature and the accused is usually not present and therefore cannot cross-
examine, first-hand evidence would be equally inadmissible. It is true that the de-
fendant in any event lacks the opportunity of cross-examining grand jury witnesses.
However, the, court seems to overlook the inherent evil in hearsay, viz., that no one
can cross-examine to test the trustworthiness of the evidence. This is by no means true
of first-hand evidence, which the grand jury may at any time subject to the test of
cross-examination.
The underlying problem goes much deeper than the present decision would admit.
The substantial rights of the person may be violated by a rule which permits one to
be held to answer for a crime pursuant to an indictment10 based on evidence which
would not meet the "competency" standard required by judicial tribunals before a
conviction can be had." In practice, whether or not a conviction could be had would
depend upon the prosecution's ability to acquire sufficient competent evidence between
the time of the finding of the indictment and the commencement of trial. It is sub-
mitted that the grand jury system, which was designed to secure ". . . individual citizens
from an open and public accusation of crime, and from the trouble, expense, and anxiety
of a public trial before a probable cause is established"'12 could, under such a rule,
become a mere rubber stamp for the prosecution. Furthermore, a certain stigma fre-
quently attaches to the person accused of a crime which neither hasty acquittal nor
the passage of time can completely cure. More serious in effect, therefore, is the
indictment handed down solely on incompetent evidence than the baseless complaint in
a civil action. Aside from the substantial rights of the accused being involved, a rule
which sanctions the return of true bills found solely upon incompetent evidence could,
conceivably, result in burdening the courts with cases difficult or incapable of proof by
the prosecution.' 3 This problem becomes magnified perceptibly when one takes note
of the present backlog on our court calendars.
The court mentioned the old case of United States v. Farrington,14 which held that
in ". . . extreme cases, when the court can see that the finding of a grand jury is based
9. 5 Wigmore, Evidence § 1420 (3d ed. 1940).
10. See U.S. Const. amend. V, "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or other-
wise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except In cases
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or
public danger."
11. Cf. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1883). This case has been erroneously cited
for the proposition that the return of an indictment based solely on incompetent evidence
does not violate due process of law. For an expression of the same view see dissenting opinion
in McKinney v. United States, 199 Fed. 25, 31 (8th Cir. 1912).
12. Jones v. Robbins, 74 Mass. (8 Gray) 329, 344 (1857).
13. See Nanfito v. United States, 20 F. 2d 376 (8th Cir. 1927) where the court, in ap-
proving the rule that grand jury investigations should be made in accordance with the well-
established rules of evidence, said: ". . . ample justification exists for such a rule, in order that
the time of the trial courts may not be consumed in disposing of matters Incapable of
proof by competent evidence; and further, that persons may not be indicted upon mere
suspicion." Id. at 378.
14. 5 Fed. 343 (N.D.N.Y. 1881).
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upon such utterly insufficient evidence, or such palpably incompetent evidence, as to
indicate that the indictment resulted from prejudice, or was found in wilful disregard
of the rights of the accused. ."15 then it will be quashed upon proper motion. It is
not evident from the opinion whether the court disapproved of the rule of the Farring-
ton case, or merely felt that the facts and circumstances of the instant case failed to
come within the test (viz., that of extreme cases) laid down there.' However, in that
the indictment in the present case was not based on even a scintilla of competent
evidence,' 7 the circumstances appear extreme indeed.
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure' s contain no requirement regarding the
character or weight of the evidence on which an indictment must be based in order
that it withstand a motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency.10 Accordingly, the
court in the instant case had no statutory rules to guide it in reaching its conclusion.
On the other hand, several of the states have enacted statutes prescribing not only the
character and weight of evidence necessary to support an indictment, but also the type
of evidence receivable by a grand jury. The New York Code of Criminal Procedure
provides that the grand jury shall receive "none but legal evidence,"2 0 and that it shall
not find an indictment unless the evidence, if uncontradicted or unexplained, is such as
would warrant a conviction at trial.21 A rule which limits the grand jury to the recep-
tion of evidence which would be admissible in a trial court impedes the investigation of
crime 2 2 while affording little or no added protection to the accused. A more enlight-
ened view would place no limitation on the character of the evidence receivable by a
grand jury, but would permit it to return an indictment only when based on such
competent evidence as would sustain a conviction.2 Such an approach would facilitate
the grand jury's investigation of criminal activity and, on the other hand, would protect
the private individual from the hazards of public prosecution without first being charged
under an indictment supported by evidence sufficiently relevant and competent to con-
vict at trial.24
Undoubtedly there will be cases, as here, where indictments based on hearsay alone
are indeed accusations based on probable cause. Nevertheless the hearsay rule, although
15. Id. at 348.
16. United States v. Costello, 221 F. 2d 668, 679 (2d Cir. 1955).
17. The evidence supporting the indictment was found by the court to consist wholly of
accountants' computations based on hearsay.
18. 18 U.S.C.A. (1948).
19. Nor do they state the possible grounds for dismissing an indictment. However, Rule
6e provides that the court may review the proceedings of the grand jury when the defendant
shows probable grounds for quashing. Evidently Congress felt that the grounds for quashing
should be a matter governed by established case law.
20. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 256 (1881).
21. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 258 (1881).
22. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2364a (3d ed. 1940).
23. The New York Commission on the Administration of Justice made proposals in 1936
(See N.Y. State Bar Assoc. Bulletin, Jan. 1938, at 24-25) to change the sections of the Code
of Criminal Procedure providing, inter alia, that none but legal evidence shall be received by
grand juries. The proposed change provided that an indictment shall be found only where
the evidence adduced would warrant a conviction by a trial jury. The net result of this
would have been the retention of the old law requiring an indictment to be supported by
such legally competent evidence as would sustain a conviction at trial, while abolishing the
rule permitting the grand jury to hear only legal evidence.
24. Cf. 62 Harv. L. Rev. III, 11S (1948).
1955]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
said to be illogical and inconsistent in its many exceptions, 2 5 still presents a simple
and workable test in determining the competency of evidence to be produced at trial.
So long as this rule obtains in our tribunals, it seems only reasonable and just that the
evidence forming the basis of an indictment should likewise be accorded the same
exclusionary treatment.2 6 Again, this reduces the possibility of wrong to the accused
and reasonably guarantees that the time of the courts will not be expended in trying
charges not susceptible of proof by competent evidence.
In view of the fact that the United States Supreme Court has never directly passed
on the precise point here involved and as there are now conflicting decisions in the
circuits, it would seem that the Supreme Court would and should grant certiorari if
requested and thereby resolve the doubt created by these decisions. 27
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-VIRGIN ISLANDS STATUTE OBVIATING
DOMICILE AS JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENT FOR DIVORCE HELD BEYOND POWER OF
TERRIToRIAL LEGISLATURE.-Petitioner-wife filed suit for divorce in the Virgin Islands
District Court, employing a local statute which provided (1) that plaintiff's six weeks
residence constitutes prima facie evidence of domicile and (2) that when both parties
are before the court, it has jurisdiction irrespective of domicile. Respondent-husband
entered an appearance and waived personal service. When asked by the court to pro-
vide further proof of domicile other than six weeks residence, petitioner refused. The
District Court dismissed the petition and the Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, affirmed
the decision. On appeal to the Supreme Court, held, three justices dissenting, affirmed.
The statute was designed for people outside the Virgin Islands and consequently was
not within the legislative power delegated by Congress to the Virgin Islands Legislative
Assembly. Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, 349 U.S. 1 (1955).
Section 9 (a)' of the divorce law of the Virgin Islands was enacted pursuant to legis-
lative authority granted to the Virgin Islands Legislative Assembly by Congress through
the Virgin Islands Organic Act 2 The Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, in affirming the
decision of the Virgin Islands District Court on the basis of its own decision in Alton
v. Alton,3 construed the statute as violative of the due process guarantees of both the
25. This is the view taken by Model Code of Evidence, c. 6, at 223 (1942).
26. This reasoning should likewise apply to all evidence considered incompetent under the
trial rules of evidence.
27. It is noted that since this article was put on the press the Supreme Court has granted
certiorari on the issue of the sufficiency of an indictment based solely upon hearsay, 24
U.S.L. Week 3093 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1955) (No. 72).
1. Laws of 1944, Virgin Islands, Bill No. 14, § 9(a) as added by the laws of 1953 Virgin
Islands, Bill No. 55. ". . . if the plaintiff is within the district at the time of the filing of the
complaint and has been continuously for six weeks immediately prior thereto, this shall be
prima fade evidence of domicile, and where the defendant has been personally served within
the district or enters a general appearance in the action, then the Court shall have jurisdiction
of the action and of the parties thereto without further reference to domicile or to the place
where the marriage was solemnized or the cause of action arose."
2. Revised Organic Act of the Virgin Islands, 48 U.S.C.A. § 1405-06 (originally enacted
in 1936).
3. 207 F. 2d 667 (3d Cir. 1953), 23 Fordham L. Rev. 206 (1954). The Supreme Court
granted certiorari in this case but intervening mootness aborted disposition on the merits
when, pending petitioner's appeal, respondent received a Connecticut divorce. 347 U.S. 610
(1954).
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fifth amendment and the Virgin Islands Organic Act. In the Afton case, the court in-
validated that part of the statute which makes six weeks residence prima fade evidence
of domicile as being an unwarranted presumption. It pointed out that "... a six weeks
sojourn without proof of intent with which one makes it we think tends to establish
nothing but the fact of six weeks physical presence." 4 The court apparently disallowed
the statutory presumption on the statistical ground that since so few Virgin Islands
divorces are contested, the statute in effect creates a rule of law under the guise of a
"rebuttable presumption." The majority reasoned that if the defendant does not
appear to rebut the presumption then the court's jurisdiction would be predicated on
residence alone and the necessity of establishing domicile would be avoided.
The minority in the Alton case contended that the presumption created by the statute
was not a substitute for domicile, and emphasized that the statute merely shifts the
burden of going forward with the evidence on the issue of domicile if there is proof of
six weeks physical presence. Thus, the statute would not create an unreasonable pre-
sumption. The only requirement for due process in the operation of legal presumptions
is that there be a rational connection between the proved fact and the presumed fact
so that an inference of the existence of one from proof of the other is not .... so
unreasonable as to be a purely arbitrary mandate." 5 It is difficult to see how the fact
of six weeks presence and the fact of domicile can be said to be so entirely unrelated
that any connection would be arbitrary.6 Further, the fact that so few respondents
have contested is not relevant to show lack of a rational connection.
The majority in the Alton case also excised that part of the statute granting jurisdic-
tion to the District Court without reference to domicile if both parties are before the
court. It relied on the second WillMas v. North Carolina decision for the proposition
that domicile is a jurisdictional requirement for divorce. The court concluded that this
part of the statute conflicted with the due process clause of the fifth amendment, for
". . if the jurisdiction for divorce continues to be based on domice... we believe
it to be lack of due process for one state to take to itself the readjustment of domestic
relations between those domiciled elsewhere," 8 and that this is so even though the
defendant consents and is in court. The minority failed to see why a legislative effort
to establish for divorce a basis other than domicile was a violation of due process,
especially where the defendant consents and has his day in court.
The Supreme Court expressly avoided the constitutional aspects of the instant case
in striking down the statute, stating "we need not consider any of the substantive
questions passed on below and we intimate nothing about them. For we find that
Congress did not give the Virgin Islands Legislative Assembly power to enact a law
with the radiations of section 9 (a)." 9 The Virgin Islands Organic Act extends local
legislative authority to all matters of a legislative character not locally inapplicable o
The decision turned on the theory that the statute was locally inapplicable because it
was designed for export--to attract divorce seekers from without the Virgin Islands.
To eliminate uncertainty as to the status of Virgin Islanders seeking divorce the
Court suggested that they avail themselves of the 1944 divorce laws as interpreted in
4. 207 F. 2d at 671.
5. Mobile v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35, 43 (1910).
6. 4 Wigmore, Evidence § 1357 (3d ed. 1940). Wigmore cites many cases to support
legislative discretion to the broadest extent in establishing rules of prima fade evidence.
7. 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
8. 207 F. 2d at 677.
9. Granvlle-Smith v. Granville-Smith, 349 U.S. 1, at 4 (1955).
10. 48 U.S.CA. § 1574 (1954).
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Burch v. Burch," where the terms "inhabitant" and "residence" were construed to
mean "domiciliary" and "domicile," thus recognizing the jurisdictional requirement of
domicile. The minority emphasized that divorce is a subject of local application and
cited numerous instances, in matters other than divorce, where territorial legislation
"designed for export" was declared constitutional.
The basis for the majority holding may be found in the statistical portion of the
decision, which indicates that the percentage of uncontested Virgin Islands divorces in
1952 was ninety-nine per cent.' 2 However, if the problem is one of transitory divorce,
it should not be discharged as one of local inapplicability. Certainly, Nevada's divorce
law, which requires six weeks presence is "designed for export" and as a practical
matter results in traffic in the affairs of another jurisdiction. In the Supreme Court's
avoiding the constitutional aspects of the statute and in its disposal of the case on the
theory of "local application," there may be found some evidence of the majority's
distaste for transitory divorce. This approach creates a paradoxical situation, the
minority argues, for "there is no virtue in a state of the law the only practical effect
of which would be to make New Yorkers fly 2,400 miles over land to Reno instead of
1,450 miles over water to the Virgin Islands." ' 3 But in justification of the majority's
opinion, it must be noted that it is the settled policy of the Supreme Court to avoid
deciding constitutional issues if the case can be disposed of on other grounds. 14
The second part of section 9 (a), granting jurisdiction to the court irrespective of
domicile if the defendant appears, has far reaching constitutional implications. Would
this part of the statute be unconstitutional If section 9 (a) were the law of a state and,
as such, not subject to the limitations of "local inapplicability"? The answer depends
on whether domicile is the only jurisdictional basis for divorce or whether the appear-
ance of both parties is sufficient. On this question, it is advisable to postulate some
propositions on the concept of domicile as already determined by the Supreme Court.
(1) Full faith and credit must be given to a jurisdictionally valid ex parte decree.15
(2) However, full faith and credit may be denied such ex parte decrees if it is found
as a matter of fact that petitioner was not domiciled in the issuing state.10 (3) In a
contested divorce action, full faith and credit must be given as against the parties if
the issue of domicile has been raised. 17 (4) In a contested divorce action, full faith
and credit must be given as against all those who are precluded from attacking the
decree in the issuing state.' 8
In proposition (3), Sherrer v. Sherrer,19 and proposition (4), Johnson v. Muelber-
ger,20 the Florida court issuing the decree required petitioner's domicile and found it
as a fact. The Massachusetts court in the Sherrer case found the petitioner was not in
fact domiciled in Florida, but the Supreme Court held that the respondent could not
attack the decree in another state because he was precluded by res judicata from col-
laterally attacking the decree in the issuing state. In the Johnson case the New York
Surrogate's Court found that the petitioner had not fulfilled the ninety day requirement
necessary to confer jurisdiction on the Florida court. The Johnson case enlarged on
11. 195 F. 2d 799 (3d Cir. 1952).
12. 349 U.S. at 13.
13. Id. at 28.
14. Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, 53 (1908).
15. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
16. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
17. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
18. Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951).
19. 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
20. 340 U.S. 581 (1951).
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the Sherrer case by holding that not only the parties themselves, but anyone precluded
from attacking the decree in the issuing state, could not attack it elsewhere. The
Florida policy was that, under certain circumstances, strangers to the original action
were precluded, and the respondent's daughter was considered such a stranger.2 ' The
New York rule is contra, since the inability of the parents to attack the decree does not
apply to the child.P Therefore, Johnson v. Muelberger could be decided differently
if New York were the issuing state and Florida the second state. In such a case,
Florida would have to allow an attack on the New York decree, although against its
domestic law, on the theory that the child would not be precluded in the New York
courts.
Assuming that a state does not require domicile as a basis for jurisdiction over
divorce, ie., a state enacting a statute like the second part of section 9 (a), none of
the cases discussed in the preceding paragraphs is a precise precedent since each state
involved in those cases required domicile to confer jurisdiction upon its courts. A case
arising under such a statute is dissimilar to propositions (1) and (2) in that the latter
are both ex parte situations. It is similar to propositions (3) and (4) in that the
respondent is before the court. However, the Sherrer and Johnson cases, though similar,
cannot be cited as precedents since they hold only that full faith and credit must be
given to litigated issues, and in a section 9 (a) (part 2) case domicile is not a litigated
issue because the court has jurisdiction "without further reference to domicile."23
Since domicile is not litigated in a section 9 (a) (part 2) divorce action, a second
state, in which an attack upon the divorce decree is made, may very well deny full
faith and credit by relying on the strong dictum in the second Williams v. North
Carolina case to the effect that domicile is a jurisdictional requisite for divorce. If the
court so holds, then not only may the respondent attack the divorce personally (unlike
the Sherrer case) even though precluded in the state issuing the original divorce decree,
but a second state may also prosecute one of the parties for a bigamous remarriage.
Further, the respondent would not be precluded by res judicata in the second state
because the second state could disregard the original decree on the ground that domicile
was not required nor litigated as it should have been. Thus, a divorce under the second
part of section 9 (a) would be subject to attack until the constitutionality of the
statute was favorably decided.
If domicile is not the sole requirement for divorce, various problems present them-
selves. For example, would it be extreme to permit an ex Parte divorce without requir-
ing the domicile of either party? This would probably be a deprivation of an absentee
defendant's rights without litigation and therefore a denial of due process.24 Section
9 (a) does not go this far. It contemplates jurisdiction of the persons as an alternate
basis for divorce. Not contrary to such a basis is the following language in Williams
v. North Carolina: "Domicil of the plaintiff, immaterial to jurisdiction in a personal
action is recognized. . . as essential in order to give the court jurisdiction which will
entitle the divorce decree to extra-territorial effect, at least when defendant has neither
been personally served nor entered an appearance."2 5
21. Id. at 588-89.
22. In re Lindgren's Estate, 293 N.Y. 18, 55 N.E. 2d 849 (1944).
23. See note 1 supra.
24. Contra David-Zeiseniss v. Zeiseniss, 205 Misc. 836, 129 N.YS. 2d 649 (Sup. Ct. 1954),
which upheld constitutionality of § 1147(2) of the New York Civil Practice Act which grants
jurisdiction where parties were married within state, resulting in the. deprivation of absentee
defendant's rights without litigation. This case was criticized in 23 Fordham L. lRev. 360
(1954).
25. 317 U.S. at 297. (Emphasis added.)
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Further, does a state have exclusive right to the divorce actions of its domiciliaries?
There is authority for the proposition that the state has a prime interest in the domestic
relations of its domiciliaries, and to deprive the state of this right is a violation of due
process. 26 This contention neglects the fact that the due process clause in both the fifth
and fourteenth amendments extends its protection to persons and not to states.
To assert that domicile is a constitutional requirement for divorce is to disregard the
evolution of the theory of domicile in divorce actions. Under Haddock v. Haddock,2 7
the jurisdictional requirement was the "matrimonial domicile" which, being indivisible,
remained where the blameless spouse was domiciled. That idea was lost in the Williams
cases which said that jurisdiction for divorce shall now be based upon either party's
domicile. Under the cases which dealt with ex parte actions, jurisdiction could be
attacked if domicile was not bona fide. The Sherrer and Johnson cases, dealing with
contested actions, said domicile could not be attacked. Because it could not be at-
tacked, does it follow that domicile has lost its importance as a jurisdictional require-
ment? Does it follow that the theory of res judicata is replacing or supplanting the
concept of domicile? The Johnson and Sherrer cases certainly are not binding prece-
dents for the proposition that domicile is no longer a jurisdictional requirement for
divorce, but they are strong in manifesting an evolution toward the substitution of res
judicata for domicile in contested divorce actions.28
In any event, it would seem fairer to permit an alien court to decide the defendant's
marital fate if the latter consents and has his day in court than to have it decided in
an uncontested divorce action brought by a domiciled petitioner.2 9
EVIDENCE-PRESUMPTIONS-PROOF OF OWNERSHIP OF SPEEDING AUTOMOBILE
CREATES No PRESUMPTION OF DRIvER'S IDENTiTY.-Use of a "phototraffic camera" by
police to measure the speed of an automobile resulted in defendant being charged for the
traffic infraction of driving an automobile at an illegal speed. The driver of the auto-
mobile was not identified or arrested at the time of the occurrence and defendant received
no notice of the charge until two weeks later. At the trial it was shown only that the
automobile was registered in the name of defendant as owner. No other proof as to the
identity of the driver of the automobile was submitted. The Court of Special Sessions
held that proof of defendant's ownership was sufficient to establish that he was
operating the automobile in violation of the speed limit when the photographs were
taken. On appeal, held, reversed. There exists no rebuttable presumption in such a
case that the owner of the automobile is the operator and extrinsic evidence is required
to establish that defendant was the driver at the time of the traffic infraction. People
v. Hildebrandt, 308 N.Y. 397, 126 N. E. 2d 377 (1955).
The significance of the decision in this case is its limiting of the rule of People v.
Rubin,' which held that proof of automobile ownership by itself establishes a prima
facie case for conviction of the owner for a parking violation. The violation in the
Rubin case constituted a traffic infraction as did the violation in the instant case. A
traffic infraction is not a crime and the penalty imposed is not considered a criminal
26. Alton v. Alton, 207 F. 2d 667, 677 (3d Cir. 1953).
27. 201 U.S. 562 (1906).
28. The Constitution of the United States of America, Analysis and Interpretation, Art. IV,
§ 1, at 671 (Corwin ed. 1952).
29. See Griswold, Divorce Jurisdiction and Recognition of Divorce Decres-A Comparative
Study, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 197-208 (1951).
1. 284 N.Y. 392, 31 N.E. 2d 501 (1940).
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penalty. It does not constitute an offense by which the credibility of a witness may
be impeached, 2 nor is a jury trial allowed although traffic infractions are otherwise
tried as misdemeanors. 3
The majority of the court in the instant case recognized that traffic infractions do
have criminal aspects and are criminal in nature and that, therefore, the criminal-law
rules of presumption of innocence and the necessity of proof of guilt beyond a reason-
able doubt should be applicable. 4 However it is equally evident that the presumption
rejected by the majority of the court in the present case does not impinge upon those
criminal-law rules. The law abounds with analogous presumptions, in the criminal law
field as well as in the civil law field. 5 Such presumptions merely establish a prima
fade case and substantial evidence to the contrary will rebut them. Unless further
proof is submitted there is nothing to justify a finding of guilt on the basis of a pre-
sumption alone. 6 The person charged with crime has his presumption of innocence and
the prosecution continues to carry the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. A presumption in and of itself creates no offense. It merely prescribes a rule
of evidence subject to rebuttable evidence.7
For a presumption to satisfy due process, it is necessary that the fact presumed have
a natural and reasonable connection with facts proven. Several New York decisions
have defined the words reasonable and natural as synonymous with ". . . just, proper,
fair and equitable." s It has been said that reasonable inferences ". . .are not fine-spun
arguments but are inferences based upon a reason or that a reasonable man would
accepL "9 The majority in the instant case was hesitant to adjudge the application of
the identity presumption to speeding cases as reasonable and natural because there
are at the present time in New York one million more automobile operators' licenses
than passenger automobile registrations. The enormity of the figure so impressed the
majority that it felt that far reaches of reasonableness has been passed.
Yet there remains room for disagreement, for in the language of the dissent, ".. ,the
circumstance that it is not always the owner of a speeding car who is at the wheel does
not ipso facto invalidate the presumption. The basic test is whether common experience
supports the probability, not the certainty, that, if the first fact is true, the second is
also true."'1° To the majority it appeared unreasonable to conclude that defendant
was driving his own car when anyone of those one million non-owners could have been
driving defendant's automobile. Just about the same ratio of drivers to owners existed
when the Rubin case was decided. The majority shied away from extending the identity
presumption to speeding cases because circumstances can stamp a speeding infraction
as a misdemeanor or a felony, thus incurring incarceration," but a parking violation
2. Walther v. News Syndicate Co., 276 App. Div. 169, 93 N.Y.S. 2d 537 (Ist Dep't 1949).
3. N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 2 (29) (Supp. 1953).
4. The court's position is amply supported. See People v. St. Germaine, 302 N.Y. $S0,
96 N.E. 2d 891 (1950) and cases cited therein.
S. People v. Reese, 258 N.Y. 89, 179 N.E. 305 (1932), identity of name used to show
identity of person in criminal case; Potts v. Pardee, 220 N.Y. 431, 116 N.E. 78 (1917), where
automobile was owned by defendant and this fact was prima fade evidence of her respon-
sibility for the manner in which it was driven.
6. Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 218 N.Y. 435, 113 N.E. 507 (1916).
7. People v. Nelson, 234 App. Div. 481, 255 N.Y. Supp. 558 (1st Dep't), afi'd, 260 N.Y.
559, 184 N.E. 91 (1932).
S. People v. O'Neill, 204 Misc. 859, 860, 128 N.Y.S. 2d 725, 726 (Sup. CL 1953).
9. International Ry. v. Boland, 169 Mlisc. 926, 929, 8 N.Y.S. 2d 643, 646 (Sup. CL 1939).
10. People v. HI0debrandt, 308 N.Y. 397, 405, 126 N.E. 2d 377, 381 (1955).
11. N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 17(5), 70(g) (1951).
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will never amount to more than a petty offense and involves no more than a mandatory
fine.
It is submitted that a fine if arbitrarily imposed is as much a denial of due process
as a jail sentence arbitrarily given. Due process does not draw the line between offenses,
misdemeanors and felonies. But the court appears to rationalize the decision in the
Rubin case by tagging parking violations as of a special sort and stating that because
the car is left unattended, with no one present to be arrested, it is not unreasonable
to charge the owner an illegal storage of his vehicle in a public street.
New York is not alone in such a judicial view. In six other jurisdictions12 proof of
ownership and unlawful parking was thought to afford a sufficient basis for the inference
of personal conduct and the creation of the identity presumption by the judiciary. On
the other hand, the Supreme Court of North Carolina, while conceding that such a
prima facie rule of evidence is desirable for the adequate enforcement of traffic regula-
tions, refused to create the presumption by judicial decree without statutory au-
thority. 13 "It is our duty to interpret and apply the law as it is written, but it is the
function and prerogative of the Legislature to make the law."' 4
Although the judiciary has refused to apply the identity presumption to speeding
cases, it does not of necessity follow that scientific speed trapping is constitutionally
impossible in New York. The legislature might well enact such a presumption. The
court in the present case states that "making rules for traffic control is peculiarly a
legislative job. . ." 5 Pennsylvania has enacted such a statute,'( and it was declared
valid because defendant was not deprived of reasonable opportunity to show that he
was not in fact operating the automobile. 17
The legislature has the general power to prescribe rules of evidence and methods of
proof 18 limited only by the requirement that there be a rational connection between
the proven fact and ultimate fact presumed and not be a purely arbitrary mandate.'0
Since the legislature has wide discretion in exercising its police power in the determina-
tion of what the public interest requires, it has it within its power to enact the necessary
measures and rules for such protection.2 0 If the regulation is reasonable and accom-
plishes a lawful public purpose it is valid.21 Reasonableness here means necessary and
proper for the attainment of some purpose within the range of the police power.22
Should the legislature determine that proper traffic regulation enforcement could be
better obtained by the enactment of the identity presumption in speeding cases it seems
safe to conjecture its validity.
The Vehicle & Traffic Law section 5923 imposes statutory civil liability on the owner
of a vehicle for its negligent operation by any person with the express or implied
12. City of Chicago v. Crane, 319 Ill. App. 623, 49 N.E. 2d 802 (1943); Commonwealth
v. Kroger, 276 Ky. 20, 122 S.W. 2d 1006 (1938); Commonwealth v. Ober, 286 Mass. 25,
189 N.E. 601 ;(1934); People v. Kayne, 286 Mich. 571, 282 N.W. 248 (1938); State v.
Morgan, 72 R.I. 101, 48 A. 2d 248 (1946).
13. State v. Scoggins, 236 N.C. 19, 72 S.E. 2d 54 (1952).
14. Id. at 21, 72 S.E. 2d at 57.
15. 308 N.Y. at 400, 126 N.E. 2d at 379.
16. Purdon's Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 75, § 739 (1931).
17. Commonwealth v. Foulke, 22 P. D. & C. 135 (1934).
18. Bd. of Comm'rs v. Merchant, 103 N.Y. 143, 8 N.E. 484 (1886).
19. Mobile v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35 (1910).
20. Weaver, Constitutional Law and Its Administration c. 27 (1946).
21. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Illinois ex rel. Grimwood, 200 U.S. 561 (1906).
22. Weaver v. Palmer Bros. Co., 270 U.S. 402 (1926).
23. N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 59 (1941).
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permission of the owner. A liability was there created where none existed at common
law2 4 to increase the responsibility of automobile owners,2 5 because the legislature was
aware that an owner could escape liability by averring that his vehicle was being used
without authority or not on his business. By analogy, the legislature may recognize,
especially as a result of the instant case, the near impossibility of adequately patrolling
the state highways when the necessity of chase and capture exists. The fact of one
million more drivers than owners, which so impressed the majority, might tend to lose
its enormity if there were a legislative expression for the need of such legislation and a
legislative recognition of the substantial relation of such legislation to the public
welfare, i.e., to meliorate the menace of speeding on the highways with its increasing
toll of death and injury. It is submitted that so long as the defendant be not precluded
from the reasonable opportunity to submit in his defense all of the pertinent facts,20
such a statute would not deny due process.
EVIDENCE-SECTION 347 or THE NEW YoRx Crvm PpAcrcnE AcT-THnw PARTY
BEN-ErIc:RY DERIVES INTEREST FRom, TIMOUGH OR UNDER PnousE.-The putative
father of an illegitimate child contracted with the child's grandmother, who as
promisee furnished the consideration for the contract to support the child until her
majority. The plaintiff as third party beneficiary of the contract brought suit against
the estate of the promisor for a judgment anticipating the installments due over the
remaining years of the agreement. At the trial, testimony of the promisee was admitted
to establish the terms of the contract, with a judgment in favor of plaintiff. The New
York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, affirmed by a divided court. On appeal, held,
two judges dissenting, reversed. The promissee, as the person from, through or under
whom the beneficiary derived her interest, is barred by the statute from testifying on
her behalf. Duncan v. Clarke, 308 N.Y. 282, 125 N.E. 2d 569 (1955).
Section 347 of the New York Civil Practice Act is designed as a protection for
estates of deceased persons. The theory is that since the dead man cannot contradict
the liabilities which he allegedly incurred, caution must be exercised in admitting
testimony against his estate.' The statute does this by rendering incompetent the
testimony of two classes of persons who are apt to have an incentive for fabricating
claims.2 Those excluded from testifying are persons interested in the event and those
who derive their interest from, through or under such persons. Protected are the
estates of deceased persons as well as those who derive their interest from, through or
under them.3 For a long time in New York it has been an open question whether third
party beneficiaries derived their interest from, through or under the promisee who
furnished consideration for the contract and were thus within the provisions of the
statute. The present decision would appear conclusively to answer this question in the
affirmative.
The case law on this point, interestingly enough, reveals several changes in which
there is more than a little legal refinement of reasoning and even some confusion. The
24. Gochee v. Wagner, 257 N.Y. 344, 178 N.E. 553 (1931).
25. Aarons v. Standard Varnish Works, 163 Misc. 84, 296 N.Y. Supp. 312 (Sup. CL), aff'd,
254 App. Div. 560, 3 N.Y.S. 2d 910 (1st Dep't 1937).
26. Mobile v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35 (1910).
1. Matter of Erdman, 198 Misc. 1087, 98 N.Y.. 2d 111 (Surr. CL 1950).
2. Matter of Christie, 167 Misc. 484,4 N.Y.S. 2d 484 (Surr. CL 1938).
3. See Greenfield, Testimony Under § 347, Civil Practice Act, Formerly § 829, Code of
Civil Procedure (1923) (an entire volume devoted to this statute).
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Court of Appeals early faced the present issue in Bouton v. Welch 4 in which the
promisor and promisee exchanged farms with a purchase money mortgage on one of the
farms to go to the promisee's wife at the promisor's death. The court allowed the
promisee's testimony concerning this transaction, despite the fact that he had furnished
the consideration for his wife's suit. The dissent took the position that the beneficiary's
rights rested solely on the consideration furnished by the promisee, who should con-
sequently have been incompetent to testify.5
A complete reversal of this rule was pronounced in Rousseau v. Rouss.0 In that case
a mother sought to testify on behalf of her son that his putative father had agreed to
settle a lump sum on the boy at his tenth birthday provided she kept him in New York
City. The court found the mother an incompetent witness holding that since she had
furnished consideration for the contract the plaintiff's rights were derived from her.
The court reasoned that because consideration is a necessity in every contract it must
follow that a third party beneficiary suing on an agreement has no rights except those
which he derived from the promisee. The statute expressly bars the person from whom
the plaintiff's interest is derived from testifying on the latter's behalf against the
deceased's estate. The majority of the court distinguished the Bouton case on the
tenuous grounds that the wife had furnished individual consideration in the transfer of
real property by releasing her rights to dower.7 She was consequently not a beneficiary
but a co-promisee with a non-derivative interest. Despite this subtle distinction the
Rousseau case was unambiguous at any rate in fixing on consideration as the nexus
between the interested party and the source of his interest.
The basic problem was given an entirely different treatment in Ward v. New York
Life.8 Beneficiaries of an insurance contract sought to prevent the wife of the insured
from testifying that he had assigned the proceeds of the policy to her before his death
on the grounds that they were protected by the dead man statute. The court held that
the beneficiaries did not derive their interest from the deceased but claimed instead
directly from the insurance company, by virtue of a power of appointment in their
favor. The court reasoned that the proceeds of the policy were never owned by the
deceased in his lifetime and that consequently this was not the sort of property which
would pass to the beneficiaries by assignment or otherwise. Moreover, the court
advanced the analogy that the beneficiary of a power derived his interest from the
donor of the power rather than from the donee.9 The beneficiaries thus claimed the
4. 170 N.Y. 554, 63 N.E. 539 (1902), citing Healy v. Healy, 55 App. Div. 315, 66 N.Y.
Supp. 927 (4th Dep't 1900), Godine v. Kidd, 64 Hun 585 (N.Y. Sup. Ct,, Gen. T. 1892).
5. 170 N.Y. 554, at 558, 63 N.E. 539, at 540 (1902).
6. 180 N.Y. 116, 72 N.E. 916 (1904), reversing 91 App. Div. 230, 86 N.Y. Supp. 497 (1st
Dep't 1904).
7. See Goodman, The "From, Through or Under" Rule as to Competency of Witnesses,
9 Fordham L. Rev. 65, 80 (1940). The author points out that the purpose of the statute Is
not served by such a distinction, ". . . for whether the beneficiary furnished a portion of the
consideration can have no possible connection with the trustworthiness of the promisee."
8. 225 N.Y. 314, 122 N.E. 207 (1919).
9. Matter of Carrol, 153 Misc. 649, 275 N.Y. Supp. 911 (Surr. Ct. 1934) pointed out
the inconsistent situation which arose in the law of wills because of the employment of this
analogy whereby legatees, next of kin, and persons interested in the individual property of
the donee who could not testify at probate to establish the will could under the rule of the
Ward case testify as to the exercise of a power of appointment by the donee of the power.




death benefit from the insurance company rather than from the insured who had
designated them.
The Rousseau v. Rouss decision was based on the proposition that the third party
beneficiary derives his interest from the promisee because the latter furnishes considera-
tion for the contract. 0 In Ward v. New York Life the court sought to justify the
contradiction of this earlier case by the peculiar nature of an insurance contract. It
would seem immaterial however, that the insured did not own the proceeds of the
policy during his life, so long as it was the insured who actually transfered the interest
in the proceeds to the beneficiaries. The beneficiaries would still be taking from,
through or under the deceased the interest which they seek to protect. The court
therefore turned of necessity, to the analogy that the beneficiaries took from the donor
of the power of appointment rather than from the donee. This ignored the simple logic
that it was the donee who had designated the beneficiaries by virtue of having paid
the premiums specifically to acquire that right. It thus negated the general rule that
consideration is the connection which will join the promisee and beneficiary so as to
bring them within the scope of the statute."
The present decision conclusively restates the holding of Rousseau v. Rouss. - On the
facts of the case it establishes that the grandmother as promisee of the contract is the
person from, through or under whom the plaintiff derived her interest. Presumably the
basis for the connection can only be that the promisee has furnished the consideration
on which the plaintiff is suing. The decision however does not state this nor does it
formulate any general rule. Furthermore, it confines its discussion of the Ward case
to the mere statement that "Rousseau v. Rouss was not implicitly overruled by Ward
v. New York Life ... the latter case having been decided on the peculiar facts there
presented."' 3 This statement indicates a restrictive attitude toward the Ward decision
which presumably will now be confined to the life insurance situation exclusively.' 4 It
is now settled law that in other areas the beneficiary's interest is derived from the con-
sideration of the promisee.
Because of the practical considerations involved, the dissenting opinion makes a dis-
tinction between a contract merely to support an illegitimate child and a contract to
settle a fortune on one. In the former instance it would adopt a more liberal attitude
towards the admission of testimony. In the contract for mere support the dissent holds
that moral consideration is sufficient to bind the putative father to his promise.15
Presumably then the illegitimate child is not the beneficiary but the promisee of the
contract on which she brings suit with any third party being permitted to testify. The
10. 180 N.Y. 116, 122, 72 N.E. 916, 918 (1904).
11. See Croker v. New York Trust Co., 121 Misc. 725, 201 N.Y. Supp. 811, (Sup. CL 1923),
245 N.Y. 17, 156 N.E. 81 (1927) as an example of the confusion which resulted. At the trial
level the court held that it could not subscribe to the dictum that because consideration was
furnished by the witness the beneficiary derived his title "from, through or under " the witness.
The Court of Appeals avoided the question of consideration and held the witness interested
because he stood to recover costs. This decision resulted in a further amendment to the statute.
12. See Matter of Browning, 165 Misc. 675, 1 N.Y.S. 2d 67 (Surf. Ct. 1937).
13. Duncan v. Clarke, 308 N.Y. 282, 285, 125 N.E. 2d 569, 570.
14. Robillard v. Booth, 271 App. Div. 878, 66 N.Y.S. 2d 261 (1st Dep't 1946) holds that
Ward v. New York Life is confined to the field of life insurance. It also considers the analogy
that the beneficiary of a power derives his interest from the donor of the power rather than
from the donee as having been overruled by the amendment following Matter of Carrol, 153
Misc. 649, 275 N.Y. Supp. 911 (Surr. Ct. 1934).
15. See Matter of Gomez Trust, 270 App. Div. 322, 59 N.YS. 2d 519 (4th Dep't 1946);
Matter of Cirillo, 114 N.Y.S. 2d 799 (Surr. Ct. 1952) which express this view in dictum.
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distinction, however, cannot be sustained for the reason that moral consideration is
not sufficient to uphold even a mere contract for support. 10 In the cases cited to
buttress this proposition actual as well as moral consideration existed with the actual
consideration furnishing the real basis for the suit.17
The trend today toward greater liberalization and admissibility of testimony would
do away with the dead man statute as an unnecessary disability. Every general rule of
evidence imposes upon the courts and on litigants the burden of its application but
this is ordinarily offset by the uniformity and order which such a rule imposes in its
area as well as by the ease with which it regulates the admission of testimony. In the
problem of beneficiaries the extent of the statute's coverage has been extended or
curtailed with the requirements of the individual case and with little regard for the
broad wording of the provisions involved. The overall result of the decisions has been
a fragmentation of the law into a series of wordy legalisms. In the present case, for
example, the illegitimate child's mother was allowed to testify as a disinterested witness
on behalf of her daughter, while the child's grandmother was barred by the statute.
Keeping in mind the fact that the courts can always afford necessary protection, the
confusion in this area suggests that the statute as a whole may have become so un-
reasonable in its application as to merit repeal.
FEDERAL PROCEDURE-JUDICIAL DISCRETION PERMITTED UNDER SECTION 1404(a) oF
THE JUDICIAL CODE BROADER THAN THAT PERMITTED UNDER FORUM NON CONVEN-
IENs.-Plaintiffs, residents of Washington D. C. and Philadelphia, filed suit for damages
against defendant in the United States District Court of Pennsylvania, under the
Federal Employers Liability Act, for injuries suffered upon the derailment of one of
defendant's trains in South Carolina. Upon defendant's motion to dismiss or, in the
alternative, to transfer to the District Court of South Carolina, a transfer was granted
under section 1404(a) of the revised Judicial Code. Plaintiffs thereupon filed applica-
tions for mandamus or prohibition to the district judge to require him to set aside his
orders of transfer. The applications were denied in the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari. Upon review, held, three justices dissenting, affirmed.
The discretion granted to a judge considering transfer under section 1404(a) is much
broader than under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Norwood v. Kirkpatrick,
349 U.S. 29 (1955).
The doctrine of forum non conveniens' declares simply that a court may refuse to
exercise its jurisdiction even though it is authorized to do so by a general venue stat-
ute.2 The discretion which a judge must use in determining whether or not to dismiss
an action has been left to turn upon the facts of each case.3 However, some important
factors which must govern the court's discretion are the plaintiff's choice of forum,
facts which do or do not establish that the plaintiff chose the forum for the purpose of
vexing or harassing defendant, and the court's own administrative and legal problems.
4
16. 1 Williston, Contracts § 147 (rev. ed. 1936).
17. Todd v. Weber, 95 N.Y. 181 (1884) and Hook v. Pratt, 78 N.Y. 371 (1879).
1. For a full discussion of the development of the doctrine of forum non convenlens, see
Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law, 29 Colum. L. Rev. 1
(1929); see also Barret, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 35 Calif. L. Rev. 380
(1947).
2. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1946).
3. Williams v. Green Bay & W. R. Co., 326 U.S. 549 (1946).
4. Koster v. Lumbermans Mutual Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1947).
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The plaintiff's choice of forum should seldom be disturbed unless the balance is strongly
in favor of the defendant. 5 Whereas forum non conveniens requires dismissal of the
action, section 1404(a) of the revised Judicial Code" permits only a transfer, "... for
the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice... ." There has
been a division among the circuits as to whether the discretion involved in the applica-
tion of this section is the same as or broader than that required under forum non con-
veniens.7 The instant case is the first to present the problem to the Supreme Court.
The Court based its opinion, that the scope of 1404(a) is broader, upon the holdings
of the Court of Appeals of the Third Circuit in All States Freight v. ModarellP and
upon the rulings of the Fourth Circuit in Jiffy Lubricator Co., v. Stewart-Warner
Corp.9 Authority was found in these two decisions because a member of each court
had been intimately concerned with the legislative history of the revised Judicial
Code.' 0 The majority held that when the harshest result of a doctrine of law (dismissal
as required under the doctrine of forum non conveniens) is excised by statute it is
more than a: mere codification; it is also a revision. It was therefore decided that
Congress must have meant that the courts could now grant transfers upon a lesser
showing of inconvenience. The Court then indicated that "this is not to say that the
relevant factors have changed or that the plaintiff's choice of forum is not to be con-
sidered, but only that the discretion to be exercised is broadeL"1
The dissent hastened to point out the confusion with which the courts will be faced
as a result of the holding of the majority. What inconvenience will be required and
when will it be in the interest of justice for a judge to order a transfer? The reviser's
note-2 indicates that one of the main purposes of enacting section 1404(a) was to
satisfy a need created by the decision in Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Kepner,23 which
held that forum non conveniens did not apply to the special venue provisions of the
Federal Employers Liability Act.' 4 Immediately preceding this remark the reviser
S. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 50S.
6. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1404(a) (1948).
7. Three Circuits-the Second, Sixth and the District of Columbia have held that the
discretion of the district courts is limited by the principles established under forum non con-
veniens. Nicol v. Koscinski, 188 F. 2d 537 (6th Cir. 1951); Wiren v. Laws, 194 F. 2d 873
(Dist. of Columbia 1951); Ford Motor Co. v. Ryan, 182 F. 2d 329 (2d Cir. 1950). On the
other hand, the Third, Fourth and Fifth Circuits have found that 1404(a) is much broader
in scope. All States Freight v. Modarelli, 196 F. 2d 1010 (3d Cir. 1952); Amalgamated Ass'n
v. Southern Bus Lines, 172 F. 2d 946 (Sth Cir. 1949) ; Jiffy Lubricator Co. v. Stewart-Warner
Corp., 177 F. 2d 360 (4th Cir. 1949).
S. 196 F. 2d 1010 (3d Cir. 1952).
9. 177 F. 2d 360 (4th Cir. 1949).
10. Judge Maris, who was the Chairman of the Judicial Conference Committee on the
revision of the Code, sat on the Court of Appeals en banc when it held in the All States
Freight case that the ".. . words of 1404(a) should be considered for what they say, not
-with preconceived limitations derived from the forum non conveniens doctrine." 196 F. 2d at
1011. Judge Parker, who was a consultant to the Advisory Committee, stated in the Jiffy
Lubricator case that the purpose of this section was to grant broadly the power of transfer.
177 F. 2d at 362.
11. 349 U.S. at 32.
12. Ex Parte Collett 337 US. 55, 68 (1949).
13. 314 U.S. 44 (1941).
14. The dissent in the Baltimore case, questioned the majority of the Court, stating, "is
the settled doctrine of forum non conveniens to be deemed impliedly repealed by every such
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stated that this section was drafted in accordance with the doctrine of forum non
conveniens. It is not likely that the reviser could have meant that the section was
drafted to correct the ruling in the Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. case and at the same time
enlarge upon the doctrine of forum non conveniens. 15 The remark apparently meant
that now forum non conveniens would apply to all actions and that the discretion to be
used in the application of this doctrine would be that used to determine whether or
not a transfer should be granted under 1404(a). This interpretation seems more prob-
able when it is considered that the ruling in the Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. case had led
to the practice of "forum shopping" by unscrupulous plaintiffs.10 Subsequent to the
passage of the revised Judicial Code, the Supreme Court in Ex parte Collett 17 made it
clear that henceforth forum non conveniens, as limited by 1404(a) so as to allow
transfer to another venue instead of dismissal, was applicable to actions under the
Federal Employers Liability Act. This rule was a sound decision leading to a greater
balance of interests and it eliminated the evils of plaintiff's seeking to harass defendant
by an unchangeable choice of venue. The decision in the principal case, however,
represents a swing of the pendulum in the other direction and thus makes possible a
complete denial of the plaintiff's rights in suits under the act. This is so because the
court now has an undefined discretion in permitting transfers for the convenience of
parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, and the transfer is not appealable' 8
as it is not a final decision from which an appeal can be taken. Inasmuch as the dis-
cretion exercised by the trial judge is not subject to appeal until the case, on its merits,
is decided in the new venue, the plaintiff is placed in almost the same position as
he was in 1910 before the passage of the Federal Employees Liability Act. This is
illustrated by the fact that trial in the new venue is an event which conceivably may
never take place if, for example, the plaintiff is financially unable to pursue litigation
there.
Another facet of the problem is the division of the various circuits on the question
of whether a writ of mandamus is proper in such cases. It has been held that a writ
of mandamus ordinarily will not be issued to review the lawful discretion of a district
court. 19 Several circuits have stated that mandamus will issue where the district court
declines to exercise its discretion 20 or where the transfer is erroneously made to a
venue provision? Surely, it is much more consonant with reason and right to read venue
provisions in the familiar context of established law rather than to impute to Congress an
unconsidered, profound alteration. . . ." 314 U.S. at 62.
15. "The Judicial Code Revision did not change the underlying basic principles of
venue . . . .It adopts the principle of forum non conveniens, but provides for a transfer,
not dismissal, of any action to a proper and more convenient forum." 3 Moore's Federal
Practice 2141 (2d ed. 1948).
16. Miles v. Ill. Central R.R., 315 U.S. 698, 706 (1942).
17. 337 U.S. 55 (1949). In this case the court made a complete study of the legislative
history of the Judicial Act of 1948 and found that the reviser's notes were before Congress
at every subsequent legislative step and that there could be no mistake that Congress Intended
to make the doctrine of forum non conveniens applicable to FELA suits.
18. Th6 courts generally are in accord that an order transferring or refusing a transfer Is
not a final decision and hence is not appealable. Ford Motor Co. v. Ryan, 182 F. 2d 329
(2d Cir. 1950); Jiffy Lubricator Co. v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 177 F. 2d 360 (4th Cir. 1949).
19. Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21 (1943); Larsen v. Swltzer, 183 F. 2d
850 (8th Cir. 1950).
20. Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. Rodney, 186 F. 2d 111 (3d Cir. 1951).
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district having no jurisdiction,2 1 and also to prevent undue hardship.m On the other
hand the Second Circuit has also ruled that once a transfer has been granted, no review
of such transfer can be obtained even where there has been an abuse of the court's
discretion23 If plaintiff is unfortunate enough to bring suit in a circuit court which
will not grant mandamus and he should lose the case in the new venue, it might be
most difficult to prove that the erroneous change of venue was the cause.
The ruling in the instant case may have very far reaching effects, inasmuch as this
section has been held applicable to stockholders' derivative actions,2 4 anti-trust suits,25
and personal injury actions where jurisdiction is based upon diversity of citizenship20
Thus, in the light of this broad judicial discretion, the plaintiff in each of these cases
must consider the jeopardy of having his case transferred to a new venue.
FEDEPAL TAxArIroN- W A GAImS CoNsTrruT INcoAE-PuNITv DAMAcES Har
TAxAE i GAs.-The Glenshaw Glass Company was involved in protracted litigation
with the Hartford-Empire Company in regard to acts of the latter, alleged to be in
fraud of the former, and in violation of the federal anti-trust laws. A settlement of
all pending litigation was reached whereby Hartford paid Glenshaw approximately
$800,000, of which sum, it was agreed to the satisfaction of all parties concerned,
$324,529.94 represented punitive damages. The sum last mentioned was not reported
as income by Glenshaw for the tax year involved, whereupon the Commissioner deter-
mined a deficiency, and the taxpayer initiated this action to recover the amount of the
tax paid thereon.
William Goldman Theatres, Inc. received a judgment against Loew's, Inc. in an
action based on violation of federal anti-trust laws, which verdict included $250,000
in punitive damages. The sum was not reported as income and the same sequence of
events as in the Glenshaw Glass case followed.
In separate rulings the United States Tax Court held that neither sum vas taxable,
and, after consolidation, the cases were brought before the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit where the decisions below were affirmed on the ground that exemplary
damages were a windfall, and as such did not fall within the meaning of the term
"income" and hence were not taxable under income tax laws. On appeal to the Supreme
Court, held, one justice dissenting, reversed. Punitive damages are "accessions to
wealth, dearly realized, over which the taxpayer has complete dominion" and are
comprehended by the term "gross income." Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348
U.S. 426 (1955).
Quite aside from the constitutional power of Congress to tax is the fact that certain
limitations as to the form of the tax exisL "... Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be
uniform throughout the United States. . ,"' and "No Capitation, or other direct,
Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census . . . 2 An apportioned tax on
land, dwelling houses and slaves was laid in 1798, soon repealed. and tried again in
21. Foster-Mulbertn Co. v. Knight, 181 F. 2d 949 (2d Cir. 1950); Shapiro v. Bonanza
Hotel Co., 185 F. 2d 777 (9th Cir. 1950).
22. Gulf Research & Development Co. v. Harrison, 185 F. 2d 457 (9th Cir. 1950).
23. Arrowhead Co. v. The Aimee Lykes, 193 F. 2d 83 (2d Cir. 1951); Magnetic Engineer-
ing & Manufacturing Co. v. Dings Manufacturing Co., 178 F. 2d 866 (2d Cir. 1950). But
see Nicol v. Koscinski, 188 F. 2d 537, 538 (6th Cir. 1951).
24. Schoen v. Mountain Producers Corp., 170 F. 2d 707 (3d Cir. 1948).
25. United States v. National City Van Lines, 337 U.S. 78 (1949).
26. Richer v. Chicago, R1. & P.R. Co., 80 F. Supp. 971 (D.C.Mo. 1948).
1. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
2. U. Const. art I, § 9.
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1813 with the same result; its administration presented almost insuperable difficulties.
Accordingly, the courts early recognized the importance of determining what were
direct taxes and what were not. In 1796 a test case on the carriage tax was brought
before the Supreme Court to determine whether or not such a tax was direct.8 In
deciding that the tax was not direct several members of the Court discussed the problem
of distinguishing which taxes were subject to apportionment. Though refusing to
commit himself, Justice Chase suggested that direct taxes might be limited to a tax on
land and a head tax.4 Justice Paterson said that "indirect taxes are circuitous modes
of reaching the revenue of individuals, who generally live according to their income."
Later developments of the problem saw a "Corporation Excise Tax" measured by the
net income of the corporation,6 an inheritance tax,1 an estate tax,8 and a gift tax0 sus-
tained by the courts as indirect under the guise of an excise on either the doing of
business or the transfer of the property involved. The tax on income was however to
have a turbulent career.
The inordinately heavy burden placed upon the Treasury by the Civil War prompted
Congress to enact a series of taxes on income between 1862 and 1864, which taxes were
not repealed until 1872, and, first in Collecto9 v. Hubbard,'0 and then in Springer v.
United States" the income tax was held to be constitutional without apportionment.
This did not settle the issue however, for when Congress again turned to the income
tax as a source of revenue in 1894, the Supreme Court, in Pollock v. Farmer's Loan
and Trust Co.,12 held that a tax on the income from real or personal property was a
direct tax to that extent invalidating the 1894 Revenue Act on constitutional grounds.
In order to subvert the effects of this decision, Congress, in 1908, introduced the
sixteenth amendment to the Constitution, which specified that: "The Congress shall
have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without
apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumera-
tion." 3 With its adoption in 1913, the amendment released Congress from the bugaboo
of apportionment at least to the extent of the bounds of the word "incomes." Through
each of the revenue acts since 1913, Congress has used words similar in import to those
found in section 22(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 in defining gross income
as ". . . gains or profits and income derived from any source whatever .... -14 It
will be noted that Congress has added the words "gains or profits" to the word income;
the problem in the courts has been whether these words are merely clarifying.
In the 1916 Internal Revenue Act, Congress specifically included stock dividends in
its definition of income. In the same year Standard Oil Company of California, having
only common stock outstanding, declared a fifty percent stock dividend, common on
common, transferring the funds therefor from surplus to capital. The Collector's right
3. Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. 171 (1796).
4. Id. at 173.
5. Id. at 179.
6. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911).
7. Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900); Scholey v. Rew, 90 U.S. 331 (1874).
8. New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345 (1921).
9. Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 US. 124 (1929).
10. 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 1 (1870).
11. 102 U.S. 586 (1880).
12. 157 U.S. 429, rehearing, 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
13. U.S. Const. amend. XVI.
14. Though the terminology of § 61(a) of the 1954 Code (definition of income) differs,
the effect has not been changed. H. R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A18 (1954); S.
Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 168 (1954).
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to impose a tax on the value of the dividend shares was considered in Eisner v.
Macomber,; 5 where the majority of a sharply divided Court announced the doctrine
of realization, and determined that a dividend in stock which did not change the stock-
holder's interest was not income. In arriving at this decision, the Court said: "For the
present purpose we require only a clear definition of the term 'income,' as used in
common speech, in order to determine its meaning in the Amendment; and, having
formed also a correct judgment as to the nature of a stock dividend, we shall find it
easy to decide the matter at issue. After examining dictionaries in common use ...
we find little to add to the succinct definition adopted in two cases arising under the
Corporation Tax Act of 1909 (Stratton's Independence v. Howbert, 231 U. S. 399, 415;
Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179, 185)-Income may be defined as the gain
derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined, provided it be understood to
include profit gained through a sale or conversion of capital assets. . . .Brief as it
is, it indicates the characteristic and distinguishing attribute of income essential for a
correct solution of the present controversy. '"1
The Macomber definition proved an easy measure alongside which to determine the
existence of taxable income. If the contested receipt was an accretion to capital, it was
taxable when realized;17 if it was not a return on capital or labor, or if it were a
restoration of wrongfully wasted capital, it was not income, and not subject to an
income tax.' 8 Thus, windfalls, such as a court induced donation by a fiduciary to a
trust estate for manipulation of the trust income not amounting to use for profit,'0 and
punitive damages,20 were excluded from income under the direct authority of the
Macomber decision, despite the contention of the Commissioner that they were gains
within the meaning of section 22(a) of the 1939 Code. The Commissioner promptly
published his non-acquiescence in the exemption of punitive damages2L and judicial
disaffirmance of this particular phase of the Macomber formula appeared in 1952 in
the case of Park & Tilford Distillers Corp. v. United States.- - There, a provision of
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 which required an officer or anyone owning
more than ten percent of a company's stock to turn over all short-swing profits in said
stock to the company was held to create income to the company. No capital or labor
of the company being involved as to it, the funds did not comply with the Macomber
definition. Certiorari was denied the taxpayer in that case, so that the first definitive
decision of the Supreme Court on this was that rendered in General American Investors
Co. v. Commissioner23 decided at the same time as the instant case.
In the Macomber case it appeared that the court was making a clear claim to be
establishing a general rule.2 4 Yet in the instant case the court denies that the Ma-
15. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
16. Id. at 206-07.
17. Lucas v. American Code Co., 280 U.S. 445 (1930).
18. United States v. Supplee-Biddle Hardware Co., 265 U.S. 189 (1924).
19. Central R.R. of New Jersey v. Commissioner, 79 F. 2d 697 (3d Cir. 1935).
20. Highland Farms Corporation v. Commissioner, 42 B.T.A. 1314 (1940).
21. 1941-1 Cum. Bull. 16.
22. 107 F. Supp. 941 (Ct. Cl. 1952).
23. 348 US. 434 (1955). The Park and Tilford case was cited with approval and the
case determined on the authority of the instant case.
24. "A proper regard for its [the 16th amendment's] genesis, as well as its very dear
language, requires also that this Amendment shall not be extended by loose construction, so
as to repeal or modify, except as applied to income, those provisions of the Constitution that
require an apportionment according to population for direct taxes upon property, real and
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comber definition was ". . meant to provide a touchstone to all future gross income
questions." 25 and seems to lay down the rule that undeniable accessions to wealth,
dearly realized, and over which the taxpayer has complete dominion are taxable income.
The case is of course supportable as a legitimate exercise of the judicial power, and
it may well be that the exigencies of the times require a change, for in the words of
Justice Holmes (defining income): "A word is not a crystal, transparent and un-
changed, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content
according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used."26
The instant case and its companion piece General American Investors Co. v.
Commissioner presage significant changes in the field of income taxes. If the definition
suggested above as the probable rule of the case is adopted as definitive, then such
items as gifts and bequests presently excluded both by the Code and under the Ma-
comber rule are exempted solely by a congressional grace, revocable at Will. How
immediate are the problems raised by the case may be seen from the provisions of
section 74 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 which renders prizes taxable without
regard to participation by the recipient. Before the enactment of this section, such
prizes were held non-taxable.2 7 They would appear also to have been non-taxable under
the Macomber rule, by statutory interpretation. It now seems probable that taxation
of these items will receive judicial sanction.
The instant case is a not-unexpected departure from a rule of long standing. Its full
effect will not be known until revenue requirements force Congress to limit further the
number of items exempted from the tax.
LABOR LAW-SECONDARY BOYCOTT-WHERE OBJECT OF UNION'S ACTION WAS TO
RETALIATE IN JURISDICTIONAL CONTEST-SECONDARY BOYCOTT PROVISION or TAFT-
HARTLEY LAW HELD INAPPLICABLE.-The International Longshoremen's Association,
Independent (ILA) and the American Federation of Labor longshoremen's union
(AFL) were in a contest for representational control of the port. An AIL longshore-
man, who had formerly been an ILA member and shop steward, had been working on
a pier where the ILA members refused to wbrk with him and went on strike. As a
consequence the longshoreman was discharged, whereupon he began picketing the pier.
Members of an AFL local truck drivers union refused to cross the picket line, after
which ILA refused to serve any AFL-manned trucks throughout the port. On the
theory that ILA's action was an illegal form of secondary boycott, an ex parte injunc-
tion was issued ordering ILA to refrain from its refusal to serve the trucks. ILA then
went on a general strike throughout the port. In a proceeding brought by the Regional
Director of the National Labor Relations Board, the District Court on the jury's
personal. This limitation still has an appropriate and important function and Is not to be
overridden by Congress or disregarded by the courts.
"In order, therefore, that the clauses cited from Article I of the Constitution may have
proper force and effect, save only as modified by the Amendment, and that the latter may
also have proper effect, it became essential to distinguish between what is and what Is not
'income,' as the term is there used; and to apply the distinction, as cases arise, according to
truth and substance, without regard to form. Congress cannot by any definition It may adopt
conclude the matter, since it cannot by legislation alter the Constitution, from which alone
it derives its power to legislate, and within whose limitations alone that power can be law-
fully exercised." 252 U.S. at 206.
25. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).
26. Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918).
27. Pauline C. Washburn v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 1333 (1945).
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verdict against ILA ordered the sentence of fine and imprisonment imposed for the
violation of the injunction. On appeal, held, one judge dissenting, order reversed. The
"object," within the statutory meaning of the term, was not to cause a cesmtion of
business between truckers and shippers, but was merely to retaliate against the AML,
and hence was not prohibited by the statute. Douds v. International Longshoremer s
Association, Independer, 224 F. 2d 455 (2d Cir. 1955).
The so-called secondary boycott provision of the Taft-Hartley Law which the union
allegedly violated is section 8(b)4(A). The term secondary boycott has evoked great
controversy throughout the history of labor law.2 It is a term that has escaped com-
prehensive definition,3 and the circumstances under which a secondary boycott may
occur have not been clearly categorized though text writers have attempted to classify
its forms.4 The stages of development of both the legislative and judicial trends in
relation to secondary boycotts can be divided into the pre-Taft-Hartley and the post-
Taft-Hartley phases. Immediately prior to the passage of the Taft-Hartley Law the
courts broadly defined what were legitimate forms of secondary pressures by labor
organizations. This judicial attitude, however, had evolved slowly from a strict
interpretation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Law,6 that labor unions were organizations
capable of being in restraint of trade, which operated in effect to prohibit many forms
of secondary boycotts.7 This line of reasoning was reiterated by the Supreme Court
when, with specific regard to secondary boycotts,8 it applied the Clayton Anti-Trust
Law2 to labor organizations. The Norris LaGuardia Act,10 by precluding injunctions
1. "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents ... (4) to
engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any employer to engage in, a strike
or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to use, manufacture, process, trans-
port, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to
perform any services, where an object thereof is: (A) forcing or requiring ... any employer
or other person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the
products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with
any other person.. . !'29 U.S.CA. § 158(b)4(A) (Supp. 1947).
2. "Seldom, if ever, has any term in American Law proved more... suggestive of greater
conflict of judicial and legislative opinion than the term 'secondary boycott.' Koretz, Federal
Regulation of Secondary Strikes and Boycotts -A New Chapter, 37 Cornell L. Q. 235 (1952).
3. The following, however, does serve as a basic description of the term: "such a boycott
exists when a labor organization having a labor dispute with employer A induces or encourages
employees of employer B, with whom the union has no dispute, to refuse to handle goods
or perform services for employer B, with the object of causing B to cease to do business with
A.... [W]hat is prohibited is any attempt to bring pressure to bear on 'secondary' employers
who are neutral in the labor dispute for the purpose of effecting, by such measures, ultimate
pressure upon the 'primary' employer." Douds v. Sheet Metal Workers International Ass'n,
Local Union No. 28, 101 F. Supp. 273, 277 (E.D.N.Y. 1951).
4. See note, 15 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 327 (1947).
5. United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310
U.S. 469 (1940). In the latter case the Court was concerned with a sit-dowm strike, but the
ruling that the Sherman Act was inapplicable because the tie-up in commerce was not intended
to result from the strike, had immediate effect on the way secondary boycott cases were to
be handled in the future.
6. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 ((1937) originally enacted in 1890).
7. Lowe v. Lawlor, 203 U.S. 274 (1903).
8. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
9. 29 U.S.CA. § 52 (1914).
10. 29 U.S.C.A. § 104 (1932).
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from being used in various forms of labor disputes, gave legislative sanction to the
liberal judicial attitude concerning secondary boycotts which developed prior to the
Taft-Hartley Law. The enactment of section 8(b)4(A) as in the case of other
statutes created the problem of determining the congressional intent as a basis for
establishing judicial interpretation of the section. Clearly the legislative intent of
section 8(b)4(A) was to forbid activities by unions which amounted to unfair second-
ary pressures."
In the instant case the refusal by the union to serve the trucks, in the court's
opinion, was not a secondary boycott in the ordinary sense because, first, there was no
labor dispute involving the employees of one employer with their employer; and,
second, there was no attempt by the employees of a second employer to aid disputing
employees by forcing or attempting to force the second employer to discontinue busi-
ness relations with the disputing employer. The court next pointed out that the refusal
by the union was not a secondary boycott in the sense to which that term was extended
by the three most recent cases in the Supreme Court of the United States construing
section 8(b)4(A).12 In all the three decisions the Supreme Court found present in the
facts the two elements which when taken together are prohibited by the statute -
(1) union influence resulting in a strike (2) the purpose of which was to cause the
cessation of business relations between an employer and a third party. The Supreme
Court decisions extended the traditional understanding of a secondary boycott in this
way: the union employees were not assisting disputing employees by going on strike;
rather the union employees were attempting to gain a good for themselves, by causing
the dismissal of non-union labor. The Supreme Court in all three cases was dealing
with situations where the established facts indicated an incidental purpose or "object"
of the defendant-unions to cause a cessation of business activity between an employer
and a third party, but impliedly from these facts the ultimate or primary reason for
the unions' actions was the promotion of unionism. This implication however, was not
expressly drawn by the Supreme Court.
In the principal case the court indicated that there was a distinction between the
motives of (a) seeking to- further unionism in general and (b) attempting to gain the
representative mandate from a given labor group, and further that a cessation of busi-
ness relations between employers and/or third parties can not be so readily condemned
when it is the result of a jurisdictional conflict. The basis for the court's distinction
is its interpretation of the term "object" as it is used in section 8(b)4(A).l s In the
three Supreme Court cases the phrase "an object thereof" was interpreted to mean that
statutory liability was imposed once it was established that a purpose of the union's
action was to cause a cessation of business relations between an employer and a third
11. United Brick & Clay Workers of America v. Deena Artware Inc., 198 F. 2d 637, 639,
rehearing denied, 344 U.S. 919 (1952).
12. National Labor Relations Board v. Denver Building & Construction Trades Council,
341 U.S. 675 (1951); International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. National Labor
Relations Board, 341 U.S. 694 (1951) ; Local .74, United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners
of America, A. F. of L. v. National Labor Relations Board, 341 U.S. 707 (1951). The fact
situations in these cases were very similar and can be summarized as follows: In a general
contracting form of business relation one of the sub-contractors hired by the general contractor
was employing non-union labor. The defendant union caused the union employees of another
sub-contractor to strike, in an effort to bring pressure to bear on the general contractor. As
a result of the strike the general contract discharged the sub-contractor who was employing
non-union labor.
13. See note I supra.
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party, even if this were merely one of the union's objectives.' 4 In none of these cases,
however, was a specific definition of the term "object" given.
In the present case the court noted that the Congress has given the term "object"
a more limited scope than the usual legal or literal definition. The court defined
"object" as: ". . the concluding state of things that the actor seeks to bring about
.... Y15 and emphasized that the term as defined is relative to the totality of steps
that the actor takes and is not applicable to merely one or several steps of the se-
quence. In applying the definition the court noted that ILA's action was, basically
and integrally considered, a reprisal because there was no affirmative indication that
the refusal was anything more than part of the contest for control of the New York
waterfront between the rival unions. However, though it was a reprisal, one of its
practical consequences was a cessation of business between the truck owners and the
shippers. Did the statute apply to this situation? The Circuit Court said it did not.
How then can the Supreme Court cases be reconciled with the instant case? In the
Supreme Court cases the primary and ultimate goal (the end) of the defendants was to
further unionism in general, and the intermediate and incidental goal (the means) was the
cessation of business relations between an employer and a third party. However, they
were not expressly arranged by the court in a means-end formula. The Supreme Court
did not go any further than rule that an "object" (the word is comprehensive enough
to include both primary and incidental ends, i.e., means and ends) expressly prohibited
by the statute, namely to cause a cessation of business between an employer and a
third party, was established by the facts. Yet by implication there is a logical connec-
tion between the ultimate goal and the intermediate object in those cases. In the
present case the court orders the sequence so that the ultimate goal (control of the
docks) and the intermediate object (the reprisal, in the form of the refusal to serve the
trucks) become logically interlocked so as not to admit the inclusion of an actual
consequence as an "object" in the statutory sense. In the Supreme Court cases the
cessations of business were directly intended consequences, whereas in the present
case the cessation of business being only an indirect result, was not an "object" within
the limited meaning given the term "object" by the Circuit Court. Underlying the
court's opinion was its explicit realization that work stoppages necessarily involve a
cessation of business activity, and that to prohibit the latter occurrence under all situa-
tions would involve the denial of the right to strike. Under the present decision a
cessation of business relations must be evidentially established as an "object" of a union's
action within the defined sense of the term. This implies a form of direct intent to
be determined at least on the facts of the instant case by examining the relationship of
the particular consequence of events to the actor's underlying basic purpose.
Had it been established that an object of the defendant in the present decision was
to cause a cessation of business between the shippers and the truckers, the court
expressed the opinion that even then the union's liability would be uncertain.'( The
first implication from this position is that a third party or employer involved in a
cessation of business activity must directly cause the cessation. The court carefully
,aid that it was not determining that implication. In the three Supreme Court cases
the sub-contractors were discharged by affirmative acts of the general contractors. 17
14. National Labor Relations Board v. Denver Building & Construction Trades Council,
341 US. 675, 638-89 (1951); International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. National
Labor Relations Board, 341 U.S. 694, 700 (1951) ; Local 74, United Brotherhood of Carpenters
& joiners of America, A. F. of L. v. National Labor Relations Board, 341 U.S. 707, 713 (1951).
15. 224 F. 2d at 459.
16. 224 F. 2d at 455.
17. See cases cited note 12 supra.
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Yet it seems clear from the statute that liability should be imposed in situations where
the cessation is not caused by an employer's or third party's actions, but is the natural
result of a defendant union's strike or inducement to strike. The second implication
from the above position is that even if an "object" of the union had been to cause a
cessation of business activity, the underlying and ultimate motive, control of the docks,
would in turn justify the intermediate and incidental object. This implication appears
to be outside the Supreme Court holdings, where once an "object" was factually
established and found to have been a prohibited goal, there was no further task left
but to rule that the union activity was an unfair labor practice. To imply that the
explicit effect of the statute may be disregarded when a union is ultimately seeking a
legitimate goal is to say that a union's action may be justified by what the union seeks
to attain and not by ascertaining whether or not the action is expressly forbidden by
the statute. This would result in a gross subversion of the statute's meaning and effect.
The strength of the instant case lies in its attempt to give a definition of the term
"object" as it is used in section 8(b)4(A), and in the description of the manner in
which the definition is to be applied to a given set of circumstances. The effect of the
decision, namely, limiting liability to those results which are proved to have been
"objects" is an important and necessary clarification of the statute, which will undoubt-
edly be pressed to the United States Supreme Court. Because the statute is worded in
the indefinite sense by use of the word "an," liability could be imposed in a myriad of
circumstances where a cessation of business relations has occurred if a literal under-
standing of the term object were used. The court in the present decision, however,
would prevent such a result on the theory that Congress did not intend the section to
have such sweeping application. The case serves to indicate that in the general field of
unfair labor practices the measure of the violation is not always to be determined by
the extent of the consequences.
PERSONAL PROPERTY-HuSBAND AND WIFE-PRESUMPTION OF JOINT TENANCY IN
WIFE'S ASSIGNMENT TO SELF AND HUSBAND.-Wife, the sole owner of a bond and
mortgage, transferred title to this property to an attorney for a nominal consideration.
At the same time, and for the same consideration, the attorney transferred the property
to husband and wife. Subsequently, the husband, under his own right, transferred, for
value, an undivided one-half interest. The wife's special guardian questioned the right
of the husband thus to alienate the property. Special Term held, inter alia, that the
husband had only survivorship rights. The Appellate Division modified the order on
the ground that the husband had acquired a present joint ownership in the bond and
mortgage through the conveyance. On appeal, held, three judges dissenting, affirmed.
In the absence of controlling indications of a different intent, personalty purchased
from the sole assets of a wife in the joint names of husband and wife presumptively
creates a joint tenancy, and not a mere right of survivorship as obtains in a husband
to wife transfer. In re Polizzo's Estate, 308 N.Y. 517, 127 N.E. 2d 316 (1955).
Determination of the type of interest had in any property by its owners is subject
to the controlling intent of the parties to the conveyance creating ihe interest.' In
the absence of firm indications of intent there has been developed a series of legal
presumptions. The basic presumption adopted in New York is found in section 66 of
the Real Property Law2 which specifies that where property is taken in the name of two
or more persons, other than executors or trustees as such, it is presumed that a tenancy
1. Matter of Blumenthal, 236 N.Y. 448, 452, 141 N.E. 911, 912 (1923).
2. N.Y. Real Property Law § 66 (1896).
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in common was intended. Though the statute refers to real property, the courts have
extended the presumption to personalty as well.3
However, a special field of presumptive rulings is applied where the parties are
husband and wife. When husband and wife take real property in their joint names
the presumption in New York4 is that an estate by the entirety is created. 5 Still
another theory is applied to personalty, for the New York courts have refused to
extend the concept of estates by the entirety beyond the realm of realty.0 If personal
property is taken in the joint names of husband and wife, and there is no evidence as
to the source of the financing, the presumption of a tenancy in common is applied to
personalty so held,7 though, under certain circumstances, such property may be
excluded from the presumption of section 66.8 These require that the husband alone
supply the funds for the purchase of the property,9 and that a different intention is
not shown.' 0 Given these conditions, the wife then acquires a mere right of survivor-
ship,"l the property belonging to her husband, subject to his control, alienation and
dominion.'2 There is, then, a well-established series of cases where the husband has
supplied all the consideration for the purchase of property in the joint names of
husband and wife, with no further indications of intent, where the courts have applied
a presumption that the husband had a complete estate and the non-contributing wife
had only a right of survivorship if the husband had not alienated before his death.2a
In the instant case, personalty was taken in the joint names of husband and wife,
and the majority found no further indications of intent. The sole distinguishing feature
was that the entire consideration was supplied by the wife. Under such circumstances
the court refused to extend the presumption applicable to situations where the husband
furnished the consideration and held that the assignment from the wife created a
present joint tenancy in the husband. The majority cited West v. JfcCullough1 4 for
the proposition that the rule creating the presumption operative in husband-to-wife
transfers is but a vestige of the common law doctrine that a husband owns all of his
wife's personalty, and a right of survivorship was the only way in which a husband
could bestow his personalty on his wife. Adopting this theory and thus assuming the
doctrine to be a residual anomaly of the common law and no more, the majority as-
serted that the presumption could have no applicability to a wife-to-husband transfer.
Though the West case did intimate that the origins of the presumption might be
rooted in the inability of a wife to hold personalty in her own right, that came court
3. Matter of Kimberley, 150 N.Y. 90D, 44 N.E. 945 (1896).
4. The varied nature of the statutory presumptions, differing "Iarried Women's Acts"
and myriad juridical interpretations necessitate individual consideration of the problem in
each state.
S. Armendi v. Dunham, 221 App. Div. 679, 225 N.Y. Supp. 37, (3d Dep't 1927), aftd,
248 N.Y. 603, 162 N.E. 542 (1928).
6. Matter of Albrecht, 136 N.Y. 91,32 N.E. 632 (1892).
7. Wetherow v. Lord, 41 App. Div. 413, 53 N.Y. Supp. 778 (Ist Dep't 1899).
8. N.Y. Real Property Law § 66 (1896).
9. Matter of Kane, 246 N.Y. 498, 504, 159 N.E. 410, 412 (1927).
10. Matter of Kaupper, 141 App. Div. 54, 125 N.Y. Supp. 878, (2d Dep't 1910), aff'd,
201 N.Y. 534, 94 N.E. 1095 (1911).
11. Sanford v. Sanford, 45 N.Y. 723, 726 (1871).
12. Ibid.
13. See cases cited in notes 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, and 11 supra.




further observed: "But I do not think that the rule [survivorship rights] rested wholly
upon the common law doctrine of unity of husband and wife, as is said, or that the
reason for it was destroyed by the acts removing the disabilities of married women."15
But if the reason for the presumption was to give the wife some interest in her
husband's personalty, an interest she could not otherwise have had, then the acts
granting her the right to hold property sole removed the basis for the presumption.
The West case expressly denied this, apparently feeling that the presumption had some
other intrinsic merits. Thus it would appear that, rather than support, the cited case
casts doubt upon the explanation proffered by the present court for its position. In the
other cases cited in the instant opinion, the fact that the husband was the party
supplying the consideration is alluded to as strictly another historical fact in each case.
In the absence of legal precedent, therefore, the opinion may be judged on its merits
as an original proposition.
It would appear that the presumption could not be anachronistic, since it requires
the consideration to be supplied from the sole assets of the party intending to benefit
his spouse, a sine qua non which would have been pointless at common law, where a
wife had no personalty to dispense. At common law the husband assumed complete
ownership of all his wife's personalty upon assuming the marital relationship, rendering
it legally impossible for her to supply any of the consideration. Of necessity then, the
presumption could not have existed prior to 1848 when married women were granted
the right to hold property sole. 18 Further, the first case cited on the proposition was
decided in 1871, twenty-three years later.17 If the presumption had its origins after
1848 as is indicated by the requirement concerning consideration discussed above, then
any distinction between husband and wife must be an arbitrary one, and "fairness
dictates that married women should be accorded equal treatment."' 8
There would seem to be fairly reasonable grounds for asserting, in addition, that,
under the peculiar facts of this case, the parties actually intended that the rights of
the husband be limited to those of a survivor. The conduit chosen for the original
transfer was an attorney; his insertion of the words, "the survivor, such survivor's
heirs," in a printed habendum clause is therefore highly significant. If he intended that
the transfer create a joint tenancy, then the phrase was superfluous, and no reasons
can be adduced for its insertion. But, having assumed that he was familiar with the
presumption at issue the phrase takes on meaning, indicating an actual intent to
apply it.
Even admitting that the rule is but a vestigial remnant of the husband's privileges,
jure mariti, it is difficult to see what could be gained by refusing to extend the doctrine.
If the court was dissatisfied with the entire presumption, the scope of the case was
broad enough to permit overruling of the previous decisions. This the court did not do.
It chose to create one rule for husbands and another for wives. In effect, its position
is that the theory is but an historical anomaly, which, rather than expunge, it would
compound, by making its application dependent upon the sex of the donee, a factor
without legal effect at the present time. The court has created a distinction between
husband and wife, which places identical gifts in separate categories, apparently with-
out persuasive reasons for its position.
15. 123 App. Div. at 848, 108 N.Y. Supp. at 495.
16. In New York by N.Y. Laws 1848 c. 200, §§ 1, 2.
17. Sanford v. Sanford, 45 N.Y. 723 (1871).
18. In re Polizzo's Estate, 308 N.Y. 517, 524, 127 N.E. 2d 316, 320 (1955).
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TORTs-M ,icrous PROSECUTION-PnRvnnE AcconEnD To ComvLAI=T FuEnD vi
ETics AND GnEvAcF ComArnTTi .- Defendant-dient had filed a complaint with a
county ethics and grievance committee charging plaintiff-attorney with improper con-
duct. The committee subsequently filed a presentment with the Supreme Court
charging the attorney with unethical and unprofessional conduct. The court issued an
order to the attorney to show cause why he should not be disbarred, but discharged
the order when it appeared that he had been acting in a non-legal capacity at the time
of the allegedly unethical conduct. The court did not consider the merits of the case
in dismissing the order. Subsequently, the plaintiff instituted an action for malicious
prosecution claiming that the complaint fled with the ethics and grievance committee
was false and without reasonable and probable cause. Trial court granted defendant's
motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint failed to set forth a cause of action.
Plaintiff appealed and the New Jersey Supreme Court certified the appeal on its own
motion prior to oral argument in the Appellate Division of the Superior Court. Held,
two justices dissenting, affirmed. Filing of a complaint with an ethics and grievance
committee is privileged and an attorney cannot predicate a malicious prosecution or
similar suit upon it. Toft v. Ketchum, 18 N.J. 280, 113 A. 2d 671, aff'd on rehearing,
-N.J. -, 114 A. 2d 863 (1955).
To be successful in an action for malicious prosecution it is required that a plaintiff
show that an action has been brought against him without probable cause' and with
malice,2 and that special injury to plaintiff has resulted.3 Additionally, the plaintiff
must show that he was successful in defending against the charges claimed to have been
maliciously made in the prior proceeding. 4
The function of ethics and grievance committees is to conduct hearings on complaints
against attorneys and to refer such complaints to the proper appellate court if there
appears to be reasonable doubt of the attorney's innocence. Whether or not such com-
plaints form a sufficient ground on which to base a suit for malicious prosecution has
been decided affirmatively in many jurisdictions. Modem courts often allow the
predication of the tort on proceedings other than criminal actions, even, as in this case,
permitting the action where the prior proceeding was not actually judicial.5 In such
cases it is required, however, that the action be adjudicatory in nature.0
The principal decision recognized the judicial character of the committee complaint
and its validity for sustaining the tort action, but it originated a rule of absolute
privilege to enshroud the accusation of dereliction. The majority found it necessary as
a matter of public policy to protect the client who brings charges of unethical conduct
1. Mayflower Industries v. Thor Corp., 15 N.J. Super. 139, 83 A. 2d 246 (1951), aff'd,
9 N.J. 605, 89 A. 2d 242 (1952); accord, Freedman v. New York Soc'y for the Suppression
of Vice, 248 App. Div. 517, 290 N.Y. Supp. 753 (1st Dep't 1936), aff'd, 274 N.Y. 559, 10
N.E. 2d 550 (1937).
2. Mayflower Industries v. Thor Corp., supra note 1; accord, Sims v. Union News Co.,
284 App. Div. 335, 131 N.Y.S. 2d 837 (Ist Dep't 1954).
3. Saum v. Proudfit, 122 N.J.L. 96, 4 A. 2d 35 (1939) ; accord, J. J. Theaters v. V.R.OZ.
Co., 96 N.Y.S. 2d 271 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
4. Kearney v. Mallon Suburban Motors, 23 NJ. Misc. 83, 41 A. 2d 274 (1945); accord,
Freedman v. Freedman, 82 N.Y.S. 2d 415 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
5. Saum v. Proudfit, 122 N.J.L. 96, 4 A. 2d 35 (1939) (action was based on complaint to
Real Estate Commission); National Surety Co. v. Page, 58 F. 2d 145 (4th Cir. 1932) (action
was based on proceeding to revoke license of an insurance agent). Contra, Lorber v. Storrow,
22 Cal. App. 2d 25, 70 P. 2d 513 (1937), where Real Estate Commission held non-judicial and
false complaint to it was not upheld as a malicious prosecution.
6. National Surety Co. v. Page, 58 F. 2d 145 (4th Cir. 1932).
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against his attorney even though those charges be malicious. It weighed the consequent
loss of the attorney's right of redress against the necessity of ridding the bar of un-
worthy members and found for the latter. These public policy factors have had pre-
vious consideration in New Jersey in Stein v. Schmitz,7 an action on the case by an
attorney charging conspiracy to ruin him in his profession. The trial court in the
Stein case expressly stated that the attorney's complaint did not set forth a cause of
action inimical to public policy and added, "even though membership in the bar is a
privilege burdened with conditions. . . the attorney is protected, like any other person,
against a wrong, predicated on actual malice. ... 8 On appeal, the judgment was
affirmed 9 and the Court of Errors and Appeals stated that the question of public
policy did not have ". . the merit deserving further discussion."1 o The majority in
the present case interpreted those words as an express reservation of discussion,
and proceeded to enunciate the privilege rule." This is an extremely questionable
interpretation.
Extensions of privilege against malicious prosecution are not uncommon. 12 The
more frequent recipients of the privilege, however, are duly constituted prosecutors.'8
The purpose of granting the privilege to prosecutors is apparent. Their official duty
is to act on complaints and their actions would be seriously impeded were they subject
to suit should they act on a complaint maliciously made. Application of such privilege
to an attorney's clients is not equally defensible. The instant case is unique in granting
a privilege to a general class of persons having no official capacity. It singles out the
legal profession for a peculiar form of policing. Attorneys themselves are not privileged
against malicious prosecution, even when acting at the instigation of their client in
bringing a malicious suit.' 4 The reason of public policy advanced by the majority gives
one pause when it is considered that doctors, pharmacists, teachers and myriad other
persons whose professions equally affect the public weal are not barred from suing
those who maliciously accuse them of delinquency. Indeed it is worthy of note that
in many jurisdictions even law enforcement officers in performance of their duty
are not granted immunity from suit should they maliciously prosecute. 18
Some courts have openly stated, as does the concurring opinion in the instant de-
cision, that actions in malicious prosecution are looked upon with disfavor.10 Rigid
attention is paid to the fulfillment of the elements of the tort, particularly lack of
probable cause.17 This strictness is intended to safeguard those who, in good faith.
7. 21 N.J. Misc. 218,32 A. 2d 844 (1943).
8. Id. at 225, 32 A. 2d at 849.
9. Stein v. Schmitz, 137 N.J.L. 725, 61 A. 2d 260 (1948).
10. Id. at 727, 61 A. 2d at 262. The Court of Errors and Appeals ruled on evldentlary
questions in this case. It declined to pass on the sufficiency of the complaint, but the matter
of public policy was properly before it and was dismissed with the words, "all other questions
have been considered and have not the merit deserving further discussion."
11. Toft v. Ketchum, 18 N.J. 280, 113 A. 2d 671 (1955).
12. Potash v. Sacks, 123 N.Y.S. 2d 913 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 282 App. Div. 962, 125 N.Y.S. 2d
787 (2d Dep't 1953).
13. Laughlin v. Garnett, 138 F. 2d 931 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 738 (1944).
14. Otto v. Levy, 244 App. Div. 349, 279 N.Y. Supp. 462 (1st Dep't 1935).
15. 28 A.L.R. 2d 646 (1953). This annotation shows a balance of authority on the judicial
immunity of law enforcement offices. It indicates, however, a tendency to extend Immunity
to such officers.
16. Prosser, 886 Torts (1941).
17. Hubbard v. Banker, 24 N.Y.S. 2d 289 (County Ct.), aft'd, 260 App. Div, 901, 23
N.Y.S. 2d 198 (4th Dep't 1940).
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bring unsuccessful actions. Despite this, the majority finds insufficient protection
where a client is accused of bringing the malicious action against his attorney and
apparently believes that a client who has legitimate grievances against his attorney will
fear bringing such grievances to light lest he himself be subject to suit. This holding
seems to impute an unwarranted fear to the average client and to open the door to
limitless attacks on members of the New Jersey bar. A client who has a reasonable
belief that his attorney has been guilty of unethical conduct has little need of this
privilege. He is adequately protected by the existing requirements for malicious
prosecution.
The effects of the present decision can hardly be salutary. Under it any client who
is resentful over an adverse decision is enabled with impunity to indulge his wrath in
a malpractice complaint against his attorney. "Granting immunity will only serve to
encourage the use of disciplinary proceedings as privileged sanctuaries to carry on
personal vendettas and excursions of ill will disassociated from the true facts in a
cause."' 8 The majority finds consolation for the attorney in the fact that if the
client is found to have brought his complaint without reasonable ground he will be
subject to citation for contempt of court. This is patently inadequate relief for the
loss of time, money and reputation incident to such charges. Every malicious prosecu-
tion is a contempt of court and can be dealt with as such even apart from the tort
action. The purpose of the tort action is redress of injury sustained by the injured
plaintiff and the majority eliminates that protection. The contempt action is a weak
and little used substitute.19
WOPMMN'S COMAPENSATION-ADVANCE By GENERAL EM%1PLoYER TOLLS THE STAT-
uTi OF LInrTATIONS AS TO SPECIAL EzPLoYE--Claimant was employed by the
general employer as a student nurse. As part of her training, she was sent to a special
employer in whose employ she contracted pulmonary tuberculosis in the regular course
of her duties. This disease was not discovered until after her return to the general
employer. Although the claimant did not file a claim within the two year period fixed
by section 28 of the Workmen's Compensation Law, the general employer had within
this time made an advance payment of compensation in the form of medical care
which had tolled the statute of limitations from running as to it. The Workmen's
Compensation Board ordered the award paid by the special employer because the
disease was contracted while in the latter's employment. The Appellate Division af-
firmed. Upon appeal, held, three judges dissenting, affirmed. An advance payment
made by the general employer tolls the statute of limitations as to both employers.
Cook v. Buffalo General Hospital, 308 N.Y. 480, 127 N.E. 2d 66 (1955).
It is well settled at common law and in Workmen's Compensation Law that a work-
man may have a special and a general employer without altering the relationship of
employer and employee between both of them and himself.' To establish the relation-
ship of a general and a special employment, it is necessary that the general employer
surrender substantial control over the employee to the special employer and the em-
ployee involved give his consent to the new arrangement either expressly or impliedly 2
18. 18 N.J. at 287, 113 A. 2d at 678.
19. Plaintiff filed petition for review by the United States Supreme Court, 24 U.S.L. Week
3059 (Sept. 20, 1955), in which the American Bar Association has announced it mill join as
amicus curiae.
1. DeN yer v. Cavanaugh, 221 N.Y. 273, 116 N.E. 992 (1917).
2. Murray v. Union Ry., 229 N.Y. 110, 127 N.E. 907 (1920).
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The issue of the respective liabilities of the general and the special employer has
frequently arisen in Workmen's Compensation litigation. The cases have held that
neither the doctrine of respondeat superior nor the rules of employers' liability for
negligence apply.3 It is not necessary that the work for the special employer be related
to the work of the general employer in order to make the latter liable, nor is it neces-
sary that the work be for his pecuniary gain.4 Under Workmen's Compensation Law,
an award can be ordered paid by either the general or the special employer or both.
The Workmen's Compensation Board has the authority to make such award as the
facts in each case justify.6
Section 28 of the Workmen's Compensation Law provides a two year statute of
limitations in which the claim must be filed,T but this time limitation can be extended
in the absence of filing a claim if there is an advance payment s made to the employee
or his dependents within the two year period. In previous cases, it has been held that
free medical care,9 paying of medical bills,' 0 or continuing of wages," are all advance
payment within the meaning of this section.
In Pogue v. Crouse Irving Hospital,12 which involved a general and a special em-
ployer, the claim was not fied within the statutory period. The claim was saved from
the statute, however, by an advance payment in the form of medical care given by
the general employer who had knowledge that the claimant's disability was contracted
in his employment so as to impose liability upon himself. The award in the Pogue case
was ordered paid by the general employer who acted only in behalf of himself when
he made the advance payment. In the principal case, the court, in a holding of first
instance, ordered the award paid by the special employer who had nothing whatsoever
to do with the medical care afforded by the general employer. The decision suggested
that the language of section 28,-"No case in which an advance payment is made to an
employee . . . shall be barred. . . ." was broad enough to make an advance payment
by either employer stop the running of the statute as to both.
It is almost self-evident that the Pogue case is not in point. The dissenting opinion
made that fact quite clear and further underscored-the absence of any agency relation-
ship between the two employers. The minority felt that section 28 should be construed
3. Dale v. Saunders Brothers, 218 N.Y. 59, 112 N.E. 571 (1916).
4. Jaabeck v. Theodore A. Crane's Sons Co., 206 App. Div. 574, 201 N.Y. Supp. 743
(3d Dep't 1923), reversed on other grounds, 238 N.Y. 314, 144 N.E. 625 (1924).
5. Dennison v. Peckham Road Corp., 295 N.Y. 457, 68 N.E. 2d 440 (1946); DeNoyer v.
Cavanaugh, 221 N.Y. 273, 116 N.E. 992 (1911); McDonald v. The City of New York,
265 App. Div. 1026, 39 N.Y.S. 2d 2 (3d Dep't 1943).
6. N.Y. Workmen's Compensation Law § 20 (1946).
7. N.Y. Workmen's Compensation Law § 28 (Supp. 1947).
8. N.Y. Workmen's Compensation Law § 28 (Supp. 1947). "No case in which an advance
payment is made to an employee or to his dependents in case of death shall be barred by
the failure of the employee or his dependents to file a claim ..
9. Glowney v. Statler's Restaurant, 267 App. Div. 1020, 48 N.Y.S, 2d 147 (3d Dep't
1944), appeal denied, 268 App. Div. 835, 50 N.Y.S. 2d 466 (1944), appeal dismissed, 293
N.Y. 854, 59 N.E. 2d 442 (1944).
10. Wood v. Queen City Neon Sign Co., 282 App. Div. 106, 121 N.Y.S. 2d 888 (3d Dep't
1953).
11. Schwartz v. The Jacobs Brothers Co., 247 App. Div. 848, 286 N.Y. Supp. 711 (3d
Dep't 1936), aff'd, 271 N.Y. 640, 3 N.E. 2d 462 (1936).
12. 281 App. Div. 931, 119 N.YS. 2d 842 (3d Dep't 1953), motion for leave to appeal
denied, 306 N.Y. 979, 115 N.E. 2d 439 (1953).
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consistently with the analogous provisions of section 59 of the Civil Practice Act.13
It recognized that Workmen's Compensation cases are not bound by the time provisions
of the Civil Practice Act,' 4 but-stated, "Nothing in the statutes nor in reason makes
any distinction in this respect between section 59 of the Civil Practice Act and section
28 of the Workmen's Compensation Law."'1
Under both section 59 and section 28 a payment stops the running of the statute,
but under section 59 when there are several or joint liabilities10 or liabilities as a
surety17 and one of the individuals liable makes a promise, acknowledgment or payment
which extends the time of limitation, the statute is extended only to the individual
performing the tolling act. It has been held that there is no agency or quasi agency
resulting from a jointly contracted liability which could make a payment by one stop
the statute of limitations as to all.' 8
The majority passed over these pertinent distinctions. It found solace in simply
stating the non-sequitur that because the Workmen's Compensation Board can
enter an award against either a general or a special employer it may find the waiver
of the statute of limitations by one a waiver by both. It is true that the Workmen's
Compensation Law is remedial legislation and should be liberally construed but that
certainly is no reason to ignore or nullify fundamental rules of the law of agency.
Because of the present court's complete abandonment of basic agency requisites, it
is impossible to predict just how far courts will carry this reasoning. The rule
established by the instant case may have a greater effect than first appears. Will the
majority's reasoning be restricted to a notice, a claim, or an advance payment, or will
the ability of one employer to bind the other be expanded to include all acts by the
other? Will a voluntary waiver of the defense of the statute of limitations by one
employer now be said to bind the other?19 Will the acts of one of the employers also
constitute a defense to the other? Will the making of a timely objection by one em-
ployer to a tardily filed claim be a defense to the other employer who did not make an
objection when the suit was filed against him?
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-DIsABILITY BENEFrTS-R IGnT OF REcoVERY OF Non-
EDUCATIONAL EmPLOYEE or EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION.-Clailmant was a member of
the maintenance crew of an office building owned and operated by Syracuse University.
He became ill and, being unable to work, sought to obtain disability benefits under the
New York State Disability Benefits Law. The building in question was located in
downtown Syracuse and was completely disassociated from the educational activities
of the university. Office and store space in the building were leased and the net rentals
were paid into the university treasury. Claimant was employed solely in connection
with the building andwas paid exclusively from the income derived from its operation.
The Workmen's Compensation Board awarded claimant benefits and the Appellate
Division affirmed the ruling. Upon appeal, held, three judges dissenting, reversed and
claim dismissed. Claimant, as an employee of a non-profit educational institution, is
13. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 59 (1926).
14. Cheesman v. Cheesman, 236 N.Y. 47, 139 N.E. 775 (1923).
15. Cook v. Buffalo General Hospital, 308 N.Y. 480, 485, 127 N.E. 2d 66, 68 (1955).
16. Van Keuren v. Parmelee, 2 N.Y. 523 (1849).
17. Winchell v. Hicks, 18 N.Y. 558 (1859).
18. Shoemaker v. Benedict, 11 N.Y. 176 (1854).
19. N.Y. Workmen's Compensation Law § 28 (Supp. 1947). The defense of the statute
of limitation is waived unless an objection to the failure to file the claim vnithin two years
is made on the first hearing at which all parties in interest are present.
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excluded from the coverage of the Disability Benefits Law. Knapp v. Syracuse Univer-
sity, 308 N.Y. 274, 125 N.E.2d 425 (1955).
New York State's Disability Benefits Law' was enacted for the purpose of extending
the benefits of the Workmen's Compensation Law to include indemnity for disabling
injuries and illnesses occurring off and apart from the job in the same manner as the
latter statute provides for those incurred in relation to an individual's employment.2
This new social security legislation3 employs the definitional approach in setting forth
inclusions and exclusions from coverage. In order to qualify for benefits, an individual
must be an employee 4 in the employment5 of a covered employer.0 Unless specifically
excluded, an individual is embraced by the act through the breadth of these definitions.
Among the few specific exclusions is the one in question, accomplished by the addition
of these words to the section defining employment: ". . . except that the following
shall not be deemed employment under this article: services performed for . . . any
corporation . . . operated exclusively for . . . educational purposes, no part of the net
earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual. . . "7
The majority of the court held in the instant case that the university's employee was
excluded from benefits under the act by reason of the foregoing provision, in that
"... his employment was, by precise language, specifically excluded from the coverage
of the law."s In its opinion the court contended that employees of non-profit educa-
tional institutions are excluded even though their services are performed in connection
with other than the strictly educational activities of the institution. The majority held
that a contrary intent was nowhere expressed or implied in the statute. Two indications
of legislative intent were cited to support these contentions. First, the original Work-
men's Compensation Law9 excluded all employees of educational institutions from
benefits until the 1929 amendment thereto which specifically limited this exclusion to
educational employees.' 0 However, in the Disability Benefits Law no such limitation of
the exclusion, says the court, appears and thus an inference of intent not to limit may
1. N.Y. Workmen's Compensation Law art. 9 (1949).
2. As stated in the dissenting opinion, Knapp v. Syracuse University, 308 N.Y. 274, 276,
125 N.E.2d 425, 427 (1955), the purpose of the Disability Benefits Law is to extend (to
employees) ". . . the benefits of social insurance against the hazards of sickness and disability
not incurred in their employment, per Governor Dewey, in approving the law (L. 1949,
c. 600)." See also 11 N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 67 (1949).
3. Only three other states have such legislation: California, Cal. Unemployment Insurance
Code div. 1, pt. 2 (1953); New Jersey, 43 N.J.S.A. 21-25 to 21-56 (1948); Rhode Island,
Acts and Resolves of R.I. c. 1200 (1942).
4. "'Employee' means a person engaged in the service of an employer in any employment
defined in subdivision six of this section .... " N.Y. Workmen's Compensation Law
§ 201(5) (1949).
5. "'Employment' means employment in any trade, business or occupation carried on by
an employer . . . ." N.Y. Workmen's Compensation Law § 201(6) (1949).
6. "'Employer,' except when otherwise expressly stated, means a person, partnership,
association, corporation ...who has persons in employment as defined in subdivision six
of this section, but does not include the state, a municipal corporation, local governmental
agency, other political subdivisions or public authority." N.Y. Workmen's Compensation Law
§ 201(4) (1949).
7. N.Y. Workmen's Compensation Law § 201(6) (1949).
8. 308 N.Y. at 275, 125 N.E. 2d at 426.
9. N.Y. Laws c. 41, § 3, group 18 (1914).
10. N.Y. Laws cc. 304, 702 (1929).
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be drawn. Second, by analogy to the Labor Relations Act" a lack of intent to limit
this exclusion is manifested. The decision by the Court of Appeals in Columbia Ud-
versity v. Herzog, 2 which ruled that collective bargaining rights were withheld by
statute from all employees of educational institutions, caused the legislature to add
to the law a limiting provision resulting in the inclusion of employees of such organiza-
tions who are engaged in the operation of buildings carried for profit-making purposes.
But again, when the Disability Benefits Law was drafted no limitation was placed on
the exclusion and so, reasoned the court, the inference is that there was an intention
not to limit the exclusion to strictly educational employees.
The dissenting opinion makes a number of points tending to show a legislative intent
to exclude from coverage only employees engaged exclusively in educational activities.
Educational institutions are not categorically excluded from the definition of "em-
ployer," i3 seemingly the most natural definition to make use of in excluding an entire
segment of employers. That the legislature recognized this is evidenced by the partic-
ular exclusion in the portion of the act defining employers, of all government sub-
divisions and agencies. But, under the definition of "employment" services performed
- for an educational institution in connection with its purely educational activities is all
that the legislature intended to exclude.
Again, the dissent reasoned, if the legislature had wished to exclude all employment
by an educational institution it would have so provided expressly as it did in the Labor
Relations Act14 and the Unemployment Insurance Law.1 And, further, the legislative
purpose as found in the original Workmen's Compensation Law as amended"0 is to
distinguish between types of services rendered by employees to educational institutions.
Finally, the dissent observed that exemptions from statutes of this kind must be
strictly construeal
It is reasonably clear that the decision of the court does not accord with the actual
intent of the legislature. If the decision were to be considered correct it would mean
that the legislature intended, in this one case, of all the social security and labor
legislation of the state wherein employees of educational institutions are excluded, not
to limit the exclusion to strictly educational employees or at least to employees other
than those engaged in the operation of profit-making enterprises.17 If the Disability
Benefits Law18 was enacted to accomplish the identical purpose with regard to off the
job injuries and illnesses as Workmen's Compensation was to effect in respect to
11. N.Y. Labor Law § 715 (1955).
12. 295 N.Y. 605, 64 N.E. 2d 351 (1945).
13. See note 6 supra.
14. N.Y. Labor Law § 715 (1955) provides: "The provisions of this article shall not
apply ... to employees of the state... or to the employees of any charitable, educational
or religious association or corporation... !'
15. N.Y. Labor Law § 560(4) (1947) provides: "...any corporation... organized and
operated exclusively for ... educational purposes, no part of the net earnings of which
inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, shall not be employers liable
for contributions under this article...."
16. See note 10 supra.
17. N.Y. Labor Law §§ 560, 715 (1955). Section 715 provides that the exemption sAl not
apply to employees whose services are performed, "... in connection with the operation of
a building owned or operated by such an association or corporation and used or occupied
as a commercial or industrial enterprise operated for the production of profit.., and which
employees are not engaged in the ... educational ... activities of such association or
corporation." N.Y. Workmen's Compensation Law §§ 3, group 18 (1946) and 201(6) (1949).
18. See note 2 supra.
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on the job accidents and maladies, it is difficult to conceive of a reason for the exist-
ence of such an intent.
Enacted over an extended period of time, the social security legislation of New York
State displays a commendable continuity of purpose together with an almost deplorable
lack of uniformity in the language of certain provisions of acts which must, from their
very natures, have been intended to accomplish parallel purposes with regard to
exemptions. Illustrations are found in a comparison of the original Workmen's Com-
pensation Law as amended, 19 wherein profit-making as well as non-profit educational
institutions are exempt, with the Disability Benefits Law,20 wherein only non-profit
organizations are excused from participation, and a contrasting of the provisions of the
Labor Relations Act,21 wherein both profit-making and non-profit educational organiza-
tions are exempt from collective bargaining but in which, by the terms of an amend-
ment,2 2 employees of these organizations engaged in the operation of buildings carried
for profit are within the act.
That these discrepancies are not intended is concretely evidenced by the celerity with
which amendments rendering the provisions less incongruous are forthcoming once the
courts have noted and acted upon a real or seeming inconsistency to the prejudice of
the legislature's true intent, for example, the amendment of the Labor Relations Act
noted above after the decision in Columbia University v. Herzog. Whenever possible,
then, without twisting the language of the statute or reading intent into the particular
act, the courts should resolve ambiguities in favor of the logical and harmonious
construction.23
19. N.Y. Workmen's Compensation Law § 3, group 18 (1946).
20. See note 7 supra.
21. See note 11 supra.
22. N.Y. Laws c. 463 (1946) until later amendment making the exemption apply only to
non-profit institutions. N.Y. Laws c. 764 (1955).
23. ". . . [Aind, if the statute is ambiguous and two constructions can be given, the one
must be adopted which will not cause objectionable results or cause inconvenience, hardship
... or lead to absurdity." People v. Ryan, 274 N.Y. 149, 152, 8 N.E. 2d 313, 315 (1937).
"The Disability Benefits Law was enacted in 1949 as an addition to the Workmen's Com-
pensation Law and as a part and parcel of the social legislation of the State. Its design Is
to accomplish the same ends as and to complement the Workmen's Compensation Law in
according benefits to employees within this State .... It is to be liberally construed In
order that its purpose may be accomplished . . . ." Knapp v. Syracuse University, 284
App. Div. 184, 186, 130 N.Y.S. 2d 529, 530 (3d Dep't 1954). (While the Appellate Division
Report uses the word "literally," it is an obvious misprint. A reading of the case makes It
clear that "liberally" was intended.)
